空間計画におけるグローバル・ローカル問題に関する基礎的研究 by 安藤  朝夫
空間計画におけるグローバル・ローカル問題に関す
る基礎的研究          






























M･ Tariq Yousuf Khanand K･ SaBaki, Roles of Public Capitalin Pakistan's Economy:
Productivity, Investmentand Growth Analysis, Review of Urban R甲ional Development
Studies, Vol.13, No.2, pp.143-162, 2001.
S-･ ･Munand K･ Sasaki, The Economic System of Small-to-Medium Sized Regions in Japan,
in B･ Johansson etal･(eds･), Theories o/ EndogenOuS Regional Growth, Springer, 2001,
K･ SaBaki, Alternative View on OptimalUrbanGrowth Controls, Annals of Rqlional Sci-





K･ Yamaguchi, T･ Ueda･I T･ Ohashil F･ Takuma, K･ TsuchiyaI T･ Hidaka, Economic Impact
Analysis of Deregulation and Airport Capacity Expansion in Japanese Domestic Avia-
tion Market, Intemational Conference on Inter-City Thnsportation, Vol.2, pp.651-663,
2002.
佐々木公明,都市成長管理とゾーニングの経済分析,有斐閣, 2003.
A･Ando, Locations of NIMBY Facilities.I When Two Adjacent Communities Decide Inde-
pendently, 42nd WRSA Meeting, Mar. 2003.




M･ Tariq Yousuf Khanand K･ Sasaki, RegionalDisparity in Pakistan's Economy: Re-
giOnal Econometric Analysis of Causesand Remedies, Regional Econometric Analysis
of Causes and Remedies, Vol.9, No.2, pp.293-308, 2003.
ii
K･ Fukuyamaand M･ Tamura, Consolidation of Network Infrastructure by Competitive L0-
6alGovernments, Proceedings Of the 2003 IEEE Inlemational Conference on Systems,
Man and Cybemelics: System Security and Assurance, CD-ROM, 6 pages, 2003.
大橋忠宏･宅間文夫･土谷和之･山口勝弘,日本における国内航空政策の効果計測に関する
実証研究,応用地域学研究, JNo.8(2), pp.45-55, 2003.
大橋忠宏･鷲見雄哉,弘前市の道路計画が都市空間構造に与える可能性,人文社会論叢　社
会科学編, No.10,弘前大学人文学部, pp.ll-26, 2003.
A･ Ando and R･ Uchida, The Space-Time Structure of Land Prices in Japanese Metropolitan
Areas, Annals of Regional Science (printing).
_耳･ Akutagawaand S･ Mun, Private Goods Provided by Local Governments, Regional Sci-




第1章　　National Balance Could Lead to Local Imbalance
(国全体での｢均衡ある発展｣と地方レベルの不均衡)　3
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Chapter 1. National Balance Could I-ead to Local lmbalance
By Asao Ando
M叫y models dealingwith the system of cities consider the population externality to represent the
agglomeration e触t･ While their majority is spaceless, the spatial distributionwithin each region
caLnnOt be overlooked･ Here we consider a nation comprlSlng two mOnOCemtric regionswith both
intra- and interregiOnal trampOrt COStS are COnSidered, where productivity is assumed to be an in-
creasimgfunction of the accessibility to the population surrouJlding the CBD. When the govemment
seeks the bala･nced development among the regions, each region can consequently become spatially
more imbal血Ced thanbefore. The model presented here is one of thとsimpleSt tO describe such
double-sided eqects of the development policies, in the form of reductions in transport costs･
1 Introduction
The major goalof the economic policy makers would be to enlarge the size of national
economy･ In the early stages of development, one of the common strategies is to concen-
trate available resources to a few selected regions known aB the growth poles,Aslong aB
scale economies are intact) this strategy could maximize the nationalproduct,and with the
existence of well-established redistribution mechanism, the regional welfare could also be
maximized･ However, redistribution in the real world is far from perfect so that regional
disparity will emerge.
Then the next question the policy makers face is how to reduce such disparities while
keeping the nationaleconomic growth. It is generally di瓜cult to define a proper measurement
for disparities･ For example, Reyand Montouri (1999) examined space-time convergence of
per capita incomes f♭r the 48 states of the continental U.S. While the per capita income may
serve as a proxy for the utility level, price differentials among regions cannot generally be
lgnOred･ Besides the utility level has to be equalized from the beginning When we employ an
equilibrium framework with free migration.
Despite the differences in regional endowments, localpoliticians may seek to equalize
the sizes of the regionaleconomies, in terms of either populations or regionalproducts. If
the regions are defined by jurisdictions, it will be socially inefRcient, if not impossible, to
equalize such macro-quantitative indices･ Thus the reglOnS in this context must be the ones
similar to the SMSA'S, which areallowed to expand as far aS the economic activities demand.
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We her占employ the nationalutility levels,along with some macro indices to describe the
perfわrmance of the development strate由es.
A point overlooked in the balanced regional growth strategy is that each region is far
from uniform, and a single policy might have double sided effects on it. For the peripheral
regions tO COmPete With the central region, it may be necessary to make most of the regional
resources concentrate on its centralcity to take advantage of scale economies. Thus even
when the policy is designed to reduce global disparity among regions, it could simultaneously
promote local disparity wi仙in eacll reglOn.
Table 1 summarizes the changes in the past decade in the nationalshares of gross regional
productsand population as well a5 those of the centralcities to the regionalamounts for five
major regions of Japan.1Traditionally the three regions, South-Kanto, Tokai, and KanSai,
are considered as the centralreglOnS, While the remaining two regions On the northand south
main islands are considered as the peripheralreglOnS･2
We canobserve that while the GRP share of the South-Kanto region decreased from
31.26% to 30.12%, that of the Kyushu region has increased from 8.36% to 8.65%. In fact,
the gap in terms of regional G氏p shares between three central and two peripheral regions
has become narrowed down in the past decade, even with certain recoveries of the central
regions after 1995. However, such movement towards regionalequalization is accompanied
by local concentration of population to the central cities 0f the peripheral reg10nS. The
population share of Sapporo to the Hokkaido region has increaSedfrom 29.62% to 32.07%,
and the similar trend in migration is observed for Fhkuoka City,and dispersion in both
G氏p and population is observed only f♭r the three central regions. In this way, the policies
designed to decrease regional disparity might have an opposite impact locally.
This paper focuses on this type of problem where a policy could bring the conflicting
global and local e鮎cts. There are a number of existing studies that discuss the regional
development of two or more regions from the egalitarian viewpoints. Koike etal. (1996)
1Asthe Japanese system of national accounts has switched丘om SNA 1968 to SNA L993 in 2000･ The statistics
have been revised retroactively b8L:k to 1990 only, aLnd direct comparison of GDP values prior to 1990 is not possible.
The table is based on the nominalGRP vdues domestic to the regions.
2The South-Kanto region, comprising Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo, and Kanagawa prefectures, is generally considered
as the capitalregion. The Tokairegion consists of Gifu, Aichi,and Mie prefectures while the KanSairegion consists
of Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo,and Nara prefectures. The Kyushu region is limited to seven prefectures on the main island.
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Table 1: Hierarchicalconcentration of GDP'Sand populations in Japan (%)･
1990 �1995 �2000 
Gap ������G氏p ������G氏p ������
NationalAmts.I 鼎S�Cs2�123611 鉄�C�3��125570 鉄�SCs��126926 
Hokkaido �2繝R�4.57 釘��R�4.53 釘��"�4.48 
Sapporoi �3B����29.62 �32繝2�30.87 �3B�32�32.07 
South-Kanto �3��#b�25.72 �#偵c"�25.94 �3���"�26.33 
TokyoWardsf 鼎b�3��25.67 鼎B縱��24.46 鼎R��2�24.34 
Tokai 湯經��8.53 湯�#r�8.61 湯�#��8.67 
NagoyaⅠ �#r緜��20.43 �#r�3��19.91 �#r��2�19.73 
Kansai ��R��B�14.66 ��B����14.54 ��B紊��14.53 
OsakaCityⅠ �3�纉B�14.48 �3�����14.25 �3�紊R�14.09 
KyuShu 唐�3b�10.76 唐紊��10.69 唐緜R�10.ll 
FhkuokaCityi ��B紊"�9.30 ��B紊r�9.57 ��B繝B�9.98 
Not髄: I Gross regional products BLre domestic for fiscal years aLnd nominaHn billion yen. Populations are in thousands
and based on the census coJldllCted on Oct･ ll 辛 Th怨e are the central cities corresponding to the metropolitanareas
shownjust above.
studied the comparative statics of a twoICity model regarding the changes in bothintra-
and inter-city transport costs, where the population size is the only source of externalities,
scale economies in productionand the utility loss from congestion. They concluded that the
improvement in the remote city'S transportation could improve the national utility. Monfbrt
and Nicolini (2000) considered a two-country model, each of which has two regions, based
on the Krugman (1991) type technology.Transport within each region is assumed free,
but the positive rates apply to interreglOnal and international freight. They numerically
examined how the transport costs a鮎ct the spatial equilibrium. While the cities or regions
in these studies are essentially spaceless, Tabuchi (1998) introduced urban space to the two-
reglOn model of the Krugman type. He showed that the spatial limitations would make
re-dispersion viable when the interregional transport cost reaches the very low level. The
urban configuration is not explicitly discussed, and its effect on productivity is indirect･
In this paper, we propose a simple two-reglOn model that directly considers the urban
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con丘guration in the form of production externality, viz. the producer enjoys greater scale
economies when population is living closer to the production site. After formulating the basic
model in Section 2, theanalyticalsolutions are obtained in Section 3 by specifying various
functions. Papageorgiouand Pines (2000) suggest that "a direct population dispersion policy
is ･ I ･ a useful complement" to rectifythe city size distortion caused by the population based
production externality. In reality, a signi丘cant portion of regional development strategy
takes the form of transport improvement. Thus it is important to examine the conflicting
effects of changes in various parameters, including the intra-and interregionaltransport
cosもS, on the different spatial levels.Asit is generally di氏cult toanalytically obtain the
qualitative results, we start our inⅦstigating the problem numerically. Section 4 discuSSeS
the procedure to obtain the numericalsolutions,and the results based on the various sets of
parameters will be examined in Section 5.
2　The model
Suppose we have two regions that are spatially separated. Each region produces one special-
ized commodity whose amount is given by Xi. The aggregate production function of each
region receives an externality from the accessibility to the households within the reglOn Ni,
besides the direct employment Ni in the region.3
X1 - 91(Nl,Nl),　　　　　　　　　　(1)
X, -　92(N,,1g2).　　　　　　　　　　(2)
For simplicity, we assume that each region is monocentric, where the production takes




3suppose there are two citieswith the same populations, but one is compactly and the other is dispersedly
distributed. Even when monetary costs of commuting are compensated throughwage payments, fatigue factor due
to long distance commuting may adyersely affect the productivity in the latter city･ Besides the popular explanation
of face-to-face contacts works favorably to the former.
4The regular assumptions on monocentric citieswill apply･ The region is located on the featureless plane, where
the land is distinguished only by the distance from the origin, andalike.
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where ni(r) is the (linear) density of household at distance r from the CBD of region i,and
fi is its fringe distance･ 6 > 0 is the distance decay ratio. When two regionsare suLRciently
far apart, ship,airplane, or high-speed train will likely be used. While access to those modes
is limited to the port, airport, or central station, we here simply assume that such a node is
located at the CBD.
Underthe assumption of full-employment of the households, we have
･i - Lfi ni(r)dr･　　　　　(5)
Wやen the country (comprising two regions) is closed in terms of migration, the totalnumber
of households must equal to the exogenouS Ⅶ山e,凡
〃1+〃2-〟. (6)
We further assume the zero profit of the aggregate firm so thatall the sales from the product
are distributedanong the Ni households in the region.
Yi - PiXi/Ni, (7)
where pi is the f･o･b. pnce of the commodity city i produces.
The household'S utility is a function of both commodities, Eland z2, and the lot size, q,
U - u(21,22,q)･　　　　　　　　　　　　(8)
Given residential location, eacll household chooses the consumption vector that derives
the maximum utility under the income specific in the reglOn it lives. The budget constraint
for the household living at distance r from the CBD of city 1 isgiven by the following
expression.
pIZl +02P222 + Rl(r)q+Tl(r) - Yl,　　　　　　　　(9)
where β2 > 1 is the interregional transport cost of commodity 2 in the iceberg fわrm while no
transport cost is required for the purchase of domestic commodity. Rl(r) and Tl(r) are the
equilibrium land rent and commuting cost to the CBD at location ㍗ in city 1, respectively.
Similarly, the budget constraint for the city 2 residents becomes,
p2Z2 + elP12:1 + R2(r)q + T2(r) - Y2.
7
(10)
Then the household's problem is to maximize (8)under the budget constraint (9) or (10)
depending on the region it lives.
When the land available for the residentialpurpose isgiven by Li(r), the static equilib-
rium guarantees that the land constraint, qi(r)ni(r) ≦ Li(r), holds inanequality wherever
the equilibrium rent exceeds the ruralopportunity rent, Ri(r) > 1h.
The demands for the commodities by the households are obtained as follows.
上′l zll(r)nl(r)dr I el Lf2 zl2(r)n2(r)dr,
Lf2 Z22(r)n2(r)dr I 02上′l z21(r)nl(r)dr,
where zji(r) represents the consumption of commodity i at the location r in region j･ How-
ever, the production of commodities only to satisfythese demands is not enoughinthe
equilibrium. AS the budget constraints, (9) and (10), indicate, the households pay the land
rentsand commuting costs to the outside landownersand transporters. The simplest way
to make the model closed in terms of commodity production would be to assume that the
landowners and transporters exchange their revenues f♭r the commodities produced in re-
spective citieS･5








月1(r)Ll(r)dr + Tl (r)nl (r)dr,  (ll)
X2 - Lf2 222(r,n2(r,dr･02l z21(r,nl(r,dr･Lf2 R2(r,L2(r,dr･Lf2T2(r,n2(r,dr, (12,
where the thirdand fourth terms on the RHS indicates the purchases by the landowners
and transporters, respectively.
Substituting the production functions, (1) and (2), into (7), (ll), and (12), we c弧
eliminate Xi from the system. Accordingly, the sum of nine variables are endogenous to
the model, i.C., the prices, Pland p2, the numbers of households, Nland N2, the reg10nal
incomes, Yl and Y2, the fringe distances, fl and f2,and the utility level U.6 The equations
5It is possible to consider that the landowners and transporters would buy the combination of the commodities
produced in both cities. However, We here assume that those from both cities would exchange the commodities they
obtainedinthe market olltSide the pr田ent model, for simplicity. As for theinterregionalshipment of commodities,
the transporters are,averted by the ''icebergM assumption･
6There a.re aL number of endogenousfunction8, Zjt(r),ni(r), aLnd R.(r), to be determinedwithin the model, but
here wefocu5 0m the macro variables which arc independent of the locationwithin the region.
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to be used to solve these variables are (5), (6), (7), (9), (10), (ll),and (12).Aseach of (5)
and (7) involves two equations regarding two regions, we have sum of nine equations, which
coincides with the number of variableS.
By virtue of the demand-supply relations, (ll)and (12), the system constitutes a general
equilibrium in terms of two commoditiesand land. The Walras'law tells us that one of the
equilibrium conditions in a general equilibrium model is redundant so that we can choose
one commodity as the num6raire.Traditionally, the Alonso-type models would assume the
unity price for the composite good. However, assuming the unity f.0.b. price for the one of
commodities in the present model is inadequate since the absolute level of prices haBalready
been introduced by the agricultural rent RAand transport cost Ti(r). 7
3　Speci丘catioms
The problem stated above takes two conflicting perspectives into account, efRciencyand
equality,and is more complicated thanit appears so that it is uneasy toanalytically derive
general qualitative conclusions. Tlms we here appeal to the numericalanalysis based on
certain speci丘cations.
We assume that the laborer, which is regarded aB Synonymous tO population, is the
only factor for production. The production function is essentially linear, but reflects the
externalityfrom the accessibility within the region Ni.
9(Ni, 1gi) - (piNi)宵1,　　　　　　　　(13)
where the production receives positive externality from the accessibility when qi > 0.8
The utility function is of the Cobb-Douglas type, and specified as
u(zl,Z2,q) - αlogzl +βlogz2 +Tlogq,　　　　　　　(14)
7The conventionalAlonso-type models are open-ended in the sense that the production at the CBD is no way
linked with the composite good consumed even if the totalrent revenues are redistributed over the households. In the
closed-city setting, the model has essentially only one equilibrium condition corresponding to (5) against the three
variables Y,p,and U･ Tlms we can freely determine the price of the composite good evenwith RA and T(r) being
predetermi ned.
8Thefunction can be regarded as Hicks-neutral rather than Harrod-neutralas the linear part of the production
function is augmented by the accessibility term even thoughthefunctionincludes only one factor, labors.
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where α + β + 7 - 1 is assumed for simplicity. Each region i8 assumed to locate on the
strip of land with unit width, L(r) - 1,and the commuting cost within each region is linear,
Ti(r) - fir, Where ti > 0 is the marginaltransport rate･
By maximizing (14) with respect to the budget constraint (9) at each point of region 1,




From (14), we candescribe q in terms of pricesand the utility level･
q - (pi)a(%)β(読)a'Oeu (15)
Similarly we have
zl-(芸)β.摩)β(響)TeUand z2-(Pi)α(孟)o･,(響)TeU･ (16)
Plugging the above reS山ts into the budget constraint (9), we get
e-U(yl - tlr) - (Pi)a(%)β(響)7･
By rearranging terms, the land rent function in region 1 is obtained･
Rl(r) - (芸)守(孟)!TVl - tlr)ie一号 (17)
The residential lot size at location rgiven commodity prices, pl and p2, Canbe calculated
by substituting月1(r) in (15) by the above･
ql(r) - (Pi)守(箸)!(yl - tlr)一撃e号　　　(18)
As for the (linear) population density, we normally regard it as being the reciprocalof (18)
everywhere inside the region, r < fl, owing to the land constraint, L(r) - l･Aseach region
becomes symmetric around its Origin, it is convenient to define the population aB being
doubled to combine the two points equally distant from the CBD･
nl(r) - 2(芸)守(孟)守(yl - tlr)誓e-号　　　(19)
The commodity consumptions at each location can also be calculating by substituting
凡(㍗) in (16), and/become proportional to disposable income at each location
zll(r) -p:(Yl -tlr) and z21(r)-孟(yl -tlr)･　(20)
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When we assume the existence of a positive ruralrent, RA > 0,9 the fringe distance in
reg10n 1 becomes
fl ≡ ilyl - (Pi)守)β(守)7eU]･　　(21)
The regionalpopulation is calculated by integrating the population density (19) for both
sides of the origin.
･1 - 2(芸)守(孟)!e一号上′1【yl -tlr]誓dr
= ilT(芸)守(孟)!ylfe一号- RA]
(22)
Considering the differences in c.i.f. prices, we obtain the functions for region 2 through
the parallel calculations as above.
R2(r) - (這)守(孟)号7(Y2 - t2r)ie-守,
q2(r) - (笠)守(Pi)f(Y2 - t2r)一撃e号,
n2(r) - 2(這)守(孟)f(Y2 -t2r)誓e一号,
212(r) -這(Y2 -t2r)and z22(r) -孟(Y2 -l2r)･　(20)′
Accordingly the fringe distanceand the regionalpopulation are obtained, respectively, as
follows.
f2 - ;lY2 - (警)a(pi)β(守)TeU],
･2 - ZlT(這)守(孟)号Y2%e一号- RA]
4　Solution procedure
Asdiscussed above, we have nine endogenous variables, pl,P2, Nl, N2, Yl, Y2, fl, f2and U. By
using (21) and (21)I, the fringe distances canbe solved as the functions of the four variables,
pl,P2,Yi,and U.
fi - fi(Yi,Pl,P2, U).　　　　　　　　　　　(21)"
9This assumption seems inevitablewith the Cobb-Douglas utilities･ Otherwise the zero commodity consumptions
must be compensated by thein6mitely large lot size, which is contra.dictorywith the丘nite urban fringe defined by
the丘nite transport cost.
iFI
Likewise from (22)and (22)I, the populations canbe written aB the functions of the same
variables.
Ni - Ni(Yi,Pl,P2, U).　　　　　　　　　　(22)"
Thus when the values of pricesand incomes are glVen, the equilibrium utility level U is to
be determined aS a丘Xed point in (6),
Nl(Yl,Pl,P2, U) + N2(Y2,Pl,P2, U) - 1g. (6)′
The RHS of equations (ll)and (12) can be written as the functions of both incomes,
prices, and the utility. Under the specification introduced in the previous section, the demand
function for the half of each region can be written as follows.
Di(Yl, Y2,Pl,P2, U) - Lf'zii(r)ni(r)dr･Oi /.f'zb･(r)n,.(r)dr･2 LIT Ri(r)dr･ti lil ni(r)rdr,
where i(≠ i) denotes the city which imports the product of city i.
For convenience sake, we define eland E2 aS the functions of the f.0.b. prices.
･1 - (慧)a(%)β(守)TeU and <2 - (警)a(pi)β(守)7eU･
Considering linear homogeneity of the utility, the demand functions for respective regions
can then be solved aB follows.




By equating these functions with the production function (13), we have the demand-supply
conditions for the product market.
Di(Yl, YT2,Pl,PB, U) - piNi(YTi,Pl,P2, U)1qi(Yi,Pl,P2, U)qi,　　　(25)
where the mechanicalintegration of (4) results in the following funcitonal forms for the acc鰯ibil-
ities, whichincorporatethe incomplete gamma function, r(V, 3) ≡ J㌘ e-ttv-ldi･
fi -墨鴫,号e十等(守,_誓lr(!･-;(yl -tlr,,].fl ,
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K2 -芸(蒜I羊(蓋,号e十等(一書,誓lr(;･一芸(Y2 -t2r"i.f21
In practice, the abovefunctionS Violate a requirement of the g-ma function, viz･ positive lower
bounds of integration, I > 0,and thlB, the numeriCalintegration seemsinevitable.
~~一ー-~ーー~~17 'Jt㌧ーー_... _ー-
Asfor the labor market, the household'SinCome can be calculated from (7) as the per capita
value of the product the region produces.
yi - PiPilgi(Yi,Pl,P2, U)qi.
(7)′
Using (21)"and (22)", We can effectively eliminate Ni and fi from the set of endogenous
variables･ Thus the system essentially has丘ve variables to be determined endogenously, viz･,
Yl･ Y2,Pl,P2･ and U･ They can be solved from the five equations: (7)'and (25) for each region, as
wellas(6)'.
The model iS SOIved in the following manner･
(1) Set the initialValues of Yl,Y2,Pl, and p2.
(2) Obtain the utility level U that solves (6)'.
(3) Find Yl, YT2,Pl, and p2 that satisfythe remaining four equations, (7)一and (25), simultane-
ously･10
(4) Stop if all of the Ave variables converge･ Otherwise repeat after (2).
5 Test simulations
The modelinvolves 14 parameters and exogenous variables to specify. They are summarized in
Table 2along with their standardandalternative values used in our test simulations. Some of
exogenous variables, such as the totalpopulation N and the agriCulturalrent RA, are fixed at the
specific levels･ In addition, the proportion of disposable income spent on land 7 is fixed at 0.2 so that
the remaining parameters associated with the utility function are assumed to satisfy α + β = 0.8.
In the present calculations, the distance decay ratio 6 associated with the accessibility function is
also丘Xed･ ♂ might become important when we study the substitutability between transportation
and communication.
10In practice, a nonlinearminimizatjon problem,
yl悪.p2 ∑((D･(Yl,Y2･Pl･P2･U) -piNt(Y"pl,P2,U)Jqt(Y"pl,P2,U)qt)2 + (yi 1.Pip.(Y.,pl,P2,U)q･)2), (26)
I
is solved･ When the simultaneous equations are solved, we should have zero as theminimized vdue.
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Table 2: Set of parameters for test calCulations.
StandardⅦlueS ��ﾇFW&��蹤庸VﾖﾇVW2� �7F�襷�&Gf�ﾇVW2�AlternatiVeValues 
α β ��紕��紕�0.310.5) 0.5(0.3) ��ﾂ�180 �#���
P2 �����200 
7 ���"�����0.2 �����
β1 ���"�1.1 ��"�0.2 ��苒�
β2 ���"�1.1 ����0.6 
tl �����0.8 �$��5 
t2 �����0.8 披�200 
The standard case is solved as follows:
Y1-323.50, Y2-350.86, p1-2.390, p2-1.557, U-3.369,
N1-77.98, N2-122.04, fl=114.09,and f2-141.45.
One might feel strange to have the asymmetric results in terms of the two regions despite the sym-
metric specification of parameters in the standard case. Namely, region 2 has a larger population,
and enjoys the higher nominalincome thanregion 1 does. However, the solution is still symmetric
in the sense that when incomes and prices are interchanged, the resulting regionalpattern is the
mirror image of the solution sited above so thatall of the five equilibrium conditions will be met･ll
Table 3 summari2;eS the test simulations for the 14 cases where one or two parameters are
diverted from the standard case･12 In the following, we briefly review the effects of minor changes
in parameters on the two regions, providing that the region 1 is smaller in the standard equilibrium.
Transportation improvement is a common measure adopted by the government to Stimulate
regionaleconomy. In our model, the parameters Oiand ti represents Such improvement.Asa
111t is possible to enforce the symmetricity by adding the constraint, pl ≡ P2･ In that case equilibrium cannot be
reached, at least numerically, aB themimimand (26) is positive.
12In Table 2, two values are considered for飽Ch of eight parameters el throughq2, and three values are COnSidered
for (1. Thiswiu generate the sum of 768 cases, In our test simulations, the equilibrium cannot be reached in 53 cases
(9･3%). It iS interesting to learn tha･tall of these cases are related to smaller qt, i.e･, at least one of q1 - 0･1･ In this
connection, among the cases listed on Table 3, only the c舶e 14 fails to reach the equilibritlm･Asthe parameter qi
identiGes the magnitude of the Hicks-neutralagglomeration eGects, the system seell鳩tO become robust when such
effectsare stronger.
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Table 3: Sample results based onalterna.tive parameters.
Case 認庸W'6柳��Yl 蕪"�Pl ��"�U ��c��〃2 貿ﾂ�f2 
1 �;���2ﾈ<�ﾓ�絣�297.36 �3Cゅ�"�2.713 ��紊���3.395 鉄���"�149.98 塔偵Sb�148.47 
2 �;��絣ﾈ<�ﾓ��2�342.58 �3Cb�#B�2.226 ��緜���3.395 ���r����92.91 ��32��B�129.03 
3I �<��ﾘ<�"ﾓ����312.48 �33r�#��2.277 ��紊モ�3.404 都偵3��120.69 ����繝��135.53 
4 �<��ﾓ����326.64 �33ゅS��2.394 ��紊唐�3.387 塔�繝��119.19 ���b經2�135.59 
5 ���"ﾓ����309.31 �3Cゅ澱�2.262 ��經CB�3.387 都b縱b�123.25 ���ゅS"�141.07 
.6I 友ﾂﾗC"ﾓ�繧�313.ll �33r經��2.318 ��經S��3.387 都偵�2�120.87 ��#ゅc��159.12 
7 佑�ﾓ�繧�309.72 �3CR�3b�2.236 ��經3R�3.390 塔���2�118.97 ��#ゅ#��138.26 
8 佑"ﾓ�繧�322.00 �332經��2.265 ��經#��3.390 都偵#��120.71 ���B��r�157.21 
9I ��ﾂﾕ�"ﾓ#���366.46 鼎�B繝B�3.226 ��緜コ�3.369 田b纉R�133.05 ��#"繝��171.18 
10 ���ﾓ#���334.67 �3sr����2.570 ��緜s2�3.369 田ゅ�b�131.94 ���"縱��155.30 
ll ��"ﾓ#���354.30 �3コ�#��2.995 ��經cR�3.369 都r�32�122.67 ��#B緜��155.52 
12I ���ﾖs"ﾓ����NoconWrgencerea.ched. 
13 ���ﾓ����307.58 �3#"經��2.188 ��紊#��3.369 塔b纉r�113.04 ���"�3��127.31 
14 ��"ﾓ����289.09 �3����b�1.816 ��經#��3.369 塔�����119.92 ���"繝B�124.80 
Not怨: I These cases ape Symmetric in terms of p町aLmeter assignments, and the two regions c弧be interchLngCd.
reductioninOi implies the improvement in the interregionaltransportation, simultaneotlS reductions
in el and e2are plausible. However, when either of the commodities is di氏cult to transport due
to its Aammable orfragile nature, it is possible that some teclmologiCalprogress can unilaterally
reduce the transport cost for such a commodity.
When theinterregionaltransport costsare simultaneously reduced (Case 3), the prices of both
commodities aB Well aB incomes in both regions will decrease. However, the regionalimbalance
will be eased, as themigration will occur from the bigger to smaller reglOnS. The fact that the
urban fringes in both regions shrink under the increased utility level indicates tha.t commodities
substitute the land. The higher productivity is achieved throughCompact living so that the average
population densities increase in both regions. This results inuneven distributions of population
withinthe regions, and this is particularly considered as a socialprobleminthe remote reglOnS.
On the other hand, if the transport cost el associated with the commodity produced in region
1 is unilaterally reduced (Case 4), this willincrease the income and the price of the commodity
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producedinthat reglOn･ This case, tool migration into region 1 occurs, but the city will expand
even thoughthe population density becomes slightly higher, which is beneficial from the viewpoint
of developlng the smaller region.
Asthe standard equilibrium is asymmetric, the effects of reductionin02 (Case 5) is not nec-
essarily parallel to Case 4 above. Althoughthe migration occurs in the opposite direction, in this
case, the prices of both commodities as well as the incomes in both reg10nS Will be decreaBedinthis
case･ Despite such de瓜ationary outcomes, the utility will increase to the same degree asinCase 4･
Thus this is the worst scenario involving the interregionaltransport improvement from region l's
viewpoint, aB it ends up with the smaller population, and yet smallet city.
The intraregionaltransport improvement is another popular measure for regionaldevelopment.
When improvement is made in both regions (Case 6), the effects similarto the simultaneous re-
duction of interregionaltranSport costsare expected. The only difference is both cities will expand
due to cheaper commuting. This is beneficial for region 1 a5 its population increa5eS and more
even land use will be expected within the reglOn･ The only drawback will be the utility increase
achieved throughthe intrareg10nalimprovement is smaller thanthe one achieved by the interre>
glOmal counterpart.
A unilateral reduction in the intraregional cost (Ca月es 7 and 8) will also produce similar results.
The incomes in both regions as well as the prices of both commodities decrease,andmigration
occurs from regions 2 to l･ Only difference is that the fringe in region 2 shrinks when tl Only is
reduced,and the largest immigration is expected by region 1 for that case. Thus the most preferable
measure to approach the population equalization would be to reduce the intrareglOnaltransport
cost in the smaller reglOnl Which is fわllowed by the unilateral reduction in the transport COSt On
the product of that reglOn, aS far as transport improvement is concerned.13
Cases 9 through14 correspond to technicalprogress. When the labor productivities of both
commoditiesare increased (Case 9), all the incomesand prices increase. However, this will lead
to the decreased population and its sparse distribution in region 1. With the fixed preference, the
increased productivity requires fewer labor inputs. The proportionaldecrease in labor demand will
lead people to move into the reglOn Whose capacity is relatively larger･ This effect of increased
productivity is similarwhen such progress occurs unilaterally asall the cases lead to decline of
130ur model does not consider congestion in intraregional transportation･ With congestion, the equilibrium size
of the bigger regionwiIl become smaller･ So the reduction in the intraregionaltransport cost in the bigger region is
likely to contribute to make the larger city even bigger.
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smaller reg10nS･ However, decline is smallest when the technology in the bigger town is umilaterally
improved (Case ll)･ If the product of the smaller region is 80mething like art血ctS, it is easy tO
imagine that the teclmicalprogress in the traditionalsector will release many craftsmen out of the
industry.
Reduction in qi implies that the Hicks-neutralagglomeration eaect becomes less important.
While we do not discuss about the changes in 6, similar effects are expected for higher 6 and lower
qi･ Namely,given population distribution, the accessibility Ni Will be lower with the higher value of
6･Asmentioned in Footnote 12 aboveT the lower value of o.i makes the systemunstable, but it will
work favorably to the region where the population is sparsely distributed. Whether o,i is reduced
in the smaller region (Case 13) or not (Case 14), the smaller region can expect immigration, but
its population distribution will become more concentrated as a result･ It isalso worth mentioning
that both types of teclmicalprogress won)t affect the utility level･
The policy makers CanSOmChowinRuence the teclmicalprogress throughprovision of taLX in-
centives to the R&D activities, but it will be more di瓜cult to alrect the households) preferences･
Anyhow, to conclude this sectionI We brie且y look at the effects of the parameter changes in the
utility function. The parameter α represents the expense ratio on the commodity produced in
region l･ When β increases (and α decreases; Case 1), the firms try to increase the production of
commodity 2 and decrease that of commodity l･ This will attract more people to region 2 and result
in decrease in the price of commodity 2･ While the incomesinboth regions decrease, the utility
levelincreaseS･ Due to the asymmetricity of the standard equilibrium, the effects of increaslng α
(Case 2) is not totally opposite to those of increasing β so that the income in region 1 will increase.
6　Concluding remarks
The numerical results discussed above are only fragmental,and might not represent the general
properties satisfied by the solutions of the modeL It is a deficiency commonly remarked concerning
the numericalanalysis･ One obvious measure is to derive those properties as arithmetically aB
possible･ Under the general eq山librium setting, it is not easy, though not impossible, even when
the functional forms are specified･ However, extensive numericalanalyses will be useful, at least,
in identifying the candidates of such properties that might possibly be proved analytically. That
is, when contradictory results are Obtained depending on the sets of parameters or initial Ⅶ山es, it
is apparent that the proposed property can hardly be proved.
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Asidefrom such technicalproblems,finding a policy to simultaneously achieve economic growth
and regionalbalance (equality) is a di缶cult question toanswer. When considering the hierarchical
structure of the reg･on, even the level of regionalequality cannot beunIquely dcRned. We hope
this paper succeedsinillustrating the significance of considering theglobaland localeLfects that a
regional policy could bring in.
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Chapter 2. Locations of NIMBY Facilities
When Two Adjacent Communities Decide Independently
By Asao Ando
This paper focu銀S On the problem tha.t each of the two neighboring cities on a linear space builds
an imcineratorfor its residents, which is a typical NIMBY facility that accrues negative cxternality.
The remote locationwill reduce externality, but increase the tax tO丘nanCC the facility. The urban
con丘gtLration prescribed by the problem hs one to four residemtialdistricts, and the switchamOng
those modes occurs discontinuouSly depending on the paLrameterSand exogenollS V&riables.Asdis-
continuity makes the analyticalcomparative statics impracticd, an alternative to state the property
as a statisticalhypothesis is proposed. The e鮎cts of the parameters on the endogenotlS V打iables
are examined asymptotically, and the difRculty associatedwith the statisticalmethod is discussed.
The combination of locations thatwill achieve the highest equilibrium lltility isalso examined.
1 Introduction
Spatialallocation of public facilities is one of the favorite subjects in urban economics. The existing
studies may be classifiedfrom several viewpoints. The number of communities considered, whether
the communities are spaceless or continuum,and the nature of externalities are among them. The
models that consider more thanone community typically study two communities, which are to
decide whether to provide the facility independently or jointly. The single-Community models tend
to consider space within tile COmmunity, but those deal with multiple communities rarely consider
space within the communities.
Many scholars have compared separateand joint provision of public facilities. While majori-
ties consider spaceless communities, some explicitly considered spaces within communities. F♭r
example, Tsukahara (1995) studied provision of optionalpublic services in the continuous spatial
framework, but his results were based onanunrealistic assumption of uniform levels of service in
each jurisdiction･ The model proposed by Kuroda (1989) possibly leads to a socially ine凪cient
solution, as it considers neither the optimal size of the facility nor the decision whether to build it.
Asfor the third point, public facilities may be classified into three types in terms of wants for
accessibility by either of the party; the localgovernment aS the service providerand the residents as
the beneficially. The arst type is the typicalof such facilities that both parties prefer accessibility.
This category Includes the city hall, public library or centralpark. The second type is characterized
by the contradiction in the preference of both parties; the government prefers accessibility, but the
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residents prefer remote locations･ Typical example is garbage iminerators and sewage plants,
which the users rarely need to visit despite daily tra･缶c between usersand facilities. The third
type･ include nuclear waste Sites, both the governnentand residents can agree to choose remote
locations aB the tranc to the facilities is negligibly less frequent.
Most of the facilities studied so far belong to the first category･ However, the second type
is important, as there exist contradictinginterests of the government and localresidents. While
everybodyunderstands the necessity of those facilities, the plan to build such facilitiesalmost
always face oppositionsfrom localresidents･ Those facilities, which provide positive externalities
globally, but negative ones locally areknOwn as NIMBY (Not-In-My-Back-Yard) facilities or LULU
( Loc ally- Unwanted- Land- Use ).
mjita (1986) studied the location of a facility that generate both positiveand negative ex-
ternalities in a topographic region･ Althoughthe model can handle twDdimensionalspace, the
externality considered is of type 3･ Accordingly) the facility must locate some of outmost points
in the region･ There are severalstudies that handle NIMBY facilities, but most of them focus on
the compensations associated with location of type 3 facilities, typically nuclear waste sites,inthe
slngle-point economy.
On the contrary, this paper focuses on the locations of type 2 facilities that must locate near
residents from supplier's point･ We consider the case where two adjacent commmities indepen-
dently provide type 2 facilities each is regarded as a source of negative externality.l specifically, We
here consider the locations of garbage incinerators, and each community is required to collect and
incinerateall the garbage discharged by its residents･ In the next section, We discuss the nature of
the problem and fわrmulate the appropriate model.
2　The model
Consider two cities located along the linear space of unit width, where the origin of coordinate is
set at the boundary ofjurisdictions･ For simplicity, we call the city to the left of the origin City 1,
and the one to the right City 2･ The cities are monocentric, and their job sitesare predetermined at
el < 0 and e2 > 0, respectively･ The workers may cross the boundary to commute to their job sites
and receive the predetermined income,粥, which is not necessarily the same between two cities.
ュwe assume there is a丘xed costinbuilding a facility, and itmight be cheaper to consider joint p,0,ision. The
comparison between the joint aLndindependent cas窃is left for the future research.
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Each city government is obliged to collect garbage from its residents and incinerate properly in
its facility. The cost of garbage treatment must be born by its residents in the form of lump-sum
tax. Accordingly, the government must decide the site of incinerator, si, and the amount of tax,
Ti, tO Cover the entire operation.
The cost of operation for City 1, Cl, is calculated aB follows.
cl - F･p/),On(r)dr･q/I,Olr - sIIn(r)dry (1)
where F is the fixed cost of the plant, n(r) is the population at location r, and fL is the left
fringe of City 1. p is theunit rate of garbage discharged by a household multiplied by the cost of
incineration,and q is the same rate multiplied by the transportation cost perunit distance･ Thus
the second and third terms imply the totalincinerationand 上ra.nsport costs, respectively, accrued
by the City 1 residents.
Likewise, the cost of operation for City 2 is calculated as follows.
C2 -F･pln(r)dr･ql rr-S2ln(r)dr･
where I, is therightfringe of City 2.
For simplicity, We denote the number of residents in each city by Ni.
･1 -/fLOn(r)dr -d N2-ln(r)dr･
(2)
(3)
It must be noted that Ni does not necessarily coincide with the number of employees at each center,
Ei, aS the cross-border commuting lSallowed in ourfranework.
The cost iS born equally by the residents or each city. Thus we ha㈹,
Tl-Cl/Nl and T2=C2/N2･ (4)
The household's utility function takes theamount of composite good, I, lot size, q,and the
distances to the incinerator sites into account.
U - Zαqp(1 -孟∑e-6'r-S.■),　　　　　(5)
I
where m is the number of such sites, and the last term represents the negative externality, providing
7,∂>0.
While the operation costs of each incinerator are collected from the residents of each city, the
negative externality accrued from the site spreads across the city boundary. Thus the residents of
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both cities will receive the externalitiesfromall the sites to some extent･ If 7 - 0, people receive
no externality･ Where lr - sit - ∞, the term becomesunity,and no externality will be observed
there either･ Otherwise the utility碧CCruedfrom consumption will somehow be reduced due to
accessibility to the facilities･ If7 - land lr - sir = 0, the externality is too severe to cancelall the
regularutilities･ Thusit will be reasonable to assume 0 < 7 < 1･
By taking the logarithms of both sides of (5), we have,
logU - αlogz ･βlogq･ log(1一三∑e-6lr-sir)　　　(6)
I
W_hen we have only two cities (m - 2),and assume the lot size being丘Xed atumity for simplicity,
(6) becomes,
logU - αlogz I log(1 1書(e~6'r~SlE I e~6'r~82')).




where T is the marginalcommuting cost, which is assumed to be linear, R(r) is the land rent, and
T(r)-Tl (r≦0) and T(r)-T2 (r>0).　　　　　　(9)
While the tax is determined by the place of residence, the commuting costand incomeare deter-
mined by the job site i.
Two points relevant to the location choice in our problem mlBt be noted･ First, it is desirable
to locate the incinerators at some remote sites to minimize negative externalitiesI However, the
decision is associated with heavier tax that will curtail residents) utility･ Therefore, the sites will
be determined from the balance of these two eLfects･ Second, while the tax on residents in one city
will not be a触cted by loca･tion decision of the other city, their utility will･ In this sense, the effect
of location decision is asymmetric･
Given the utilityand appropriate tax levels, Uand Ti, the bid rent function of a household who
lives at rand works at center i is obtained as follows.
R,.(r) - Y, - TTi - TJej - rHl l書(e-6'r-SI卜 e-6'r-S21)｢姉　　(10)
where i - 1 for r ≦ 0,and i - 2 elsewhere･ Assuming the agriculturalopportunity rent being zero,
the equilibrium rent R(r) will be determined by
R(r) - maxfRl(r), R2(r),01.
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(ll)
WheLn the lot si2;e is a5Sumed to beunity, the population can be measured by the cardinality of the
residential districts.
Nl = /,≦.rR(,,,0,rdr弧d N2 - /,≧..A(,,,｡} rdr　　(12)
In the present paper, we consider the ca月e Where the combined population of two cities are fixed
at N, and each municipality individually provides the iminerator.2 Thus the major endogenous
variables are the populations, (Nl,N2), (lumr>sum) taxes, (Tl,T2), and the equilibriumutility
level, U.
3　0m Comparative statics
The problem stated above appears to be simple in the sense that it assumes the absentee landowner
absorbs rent paymentand household cannot choose the lot sizes. Nevertheless its structure is com-
plicated enoughto prevent usfromanalytically conducting comparative statics. The complication
arises from the fact that the number of residentialdistricts, viz. the spatially connected reglOnS With
positive rent, Ⅴ打ies depending on the set of parameters, and the intervals over which integration
is made must be speci丘ed accordingly･3
However, even if we limit the number of residentialdistricts to one, the expression is fairly
complicated･ h this case, the endogenous variables include the left andright boundaries, fe and
I,, as well as the populations of two cities, Nland N2, the taxes, Tl and T2, and the utility level








2This is a closed city setting'but the population can migrate between two municipalities. In that sense, each city
cannot be called closed, but definitely not open either. There is a possibility that two municipalities jointly provide
a facility. When the cost saving from increasing returns exceeds the increased costs from long-haultransportation,
one big facilitywill mal(e sense. The comparison between separate and joint provisionsis left foranOther paper.
3We call the number of residential districts mode. According to the numerical computations in the hter section.
it ranges from 1 to 4.
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･2N2 - F･pldr･qllr-S2Idr-F･pfr･qlsg-S,fr･f],
R(fe) - Yl -Tl -,(21 -fe) -[1一芸(e-6'fL-81㌧e-6'S2-JE')｢揖-0,




In the above, it is assumed that the left boundary sits to the left of city l's CBD (fe < el) and
theright boundary sits to the right of city 2's CBD (e2 < I,), However, these are notalways true as
it is possible that either of the cities is abandoned, and the entire population is housed in the other.
Suppose N1 - 0, for example･ Then N2 - Iffr dr would replace (14),and equations (17) and (17)
must. be changed accordingly･AsNl and Tl become obsolete, (13) and (15) must be dropped from
the system･While comparative static analysis based on diLrerentiations is meaningful for marginal
changes, it loses ground when structuralchangesI Such as discontinuous changes in the mode, are
Iikely.
By differentiating the above system, we have the followlng relations.
dNl +dfe - 0,
dN2 -df, -0,
dN1 +dN2 - 0,              (22)
･ldTl･TldNl･lp･q(sl-fe)]dfe-ls2-slfe･争-J(2sl-fL)dsl, (23)
N2dT2･T2dN2･[-P･q(S2-fr)]df, -ls2-S,I,･誓】dq･q(2S2-I,)ds,, (24)
dTl - Tdfe一芸(1一書9e)一苧Ui(e-6'fE-Sl'l e-6'82-fe')dfL ･三(ト書ge)一三UedU
- dYl - (21 - fe)dT - Tdel ･孟(ト芸92)一讐UilJfe - slre-6'/E-SI'･ (S2 - fe)e-6'82-fe'Jd6
-去(1一書92)一撃勅dT･76(e-6FfL-Sl'dsl - e-6(82-fL,ds2)),　　　(25)
dT2 ･Tdfr -芸(1 1書9r)一勤ま(e-6'fr-sl'- e-6fJ,-82･,)dfr ･三(1一書9,)一三UifdU
- dY2 A (fr - e2)dH ,de2.孟(1一書9r)一撃Uil(fr - sl)e-6'),-sl'･ Jfr - S2le-6JJ,-S2F]d6
1去(1 1書9r)増Ui[9,d7. 76(el6'fr-sl,dsl - e-61/r-82･ds,)i,　　　(26)
where the following COnVention is employed･
92 = e-6IfL-SIP +e16(32-jL) and gr = e-6(fr-sl) + el61fr-821
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Moreover, α iS regarded as a constant in the above to keep the expressions relatively simpler. The
signs of diaerentiation related to absolute terms are obtained by assuming fe > sl and s2 > I,,
viz･ the incinerators are located outside of the city. Of course, this would notalwayS be the case,
and fotu possible combinations must be considered depending on the solution in concern.
To apply the routine for comparative statics (e･g･ SaBaki and Kaiyama (1990)), we first rewrite





where the right hand sides, P,Q,V,W, are the functions of parameters, α,7,6,p,U, and T, and




T1 0　A 0 NI 0 0
0 T2　0　B 0 N2　0
0　0　C 0 1 0 D









Considering that dT does not appear in Pand Q, dU/dT, for example, can be checked from the
last row Of (27).
BN1 - ENIN2 + NIT2
-BDNl + AGN2 + DENIN2 I CGNIN2 - GN2T1 - DNIT2
-AN2 + CNIN2 + N2Tl
(21 - fe)
-BDNl + AGN2 + DENIN2 I CGNIN2 - GN2Tl - DNIT2 (I,-e2) (28)
Apparently, it is notaneasy task to identify the signs of the two terms multiplied to (el - /e) and
(I, - e2), even thoughOur numerical results strongly suggest that both of them are negative.
While it might be possible to analytically prove their signs, we do not pursue this direction.
The reason is that (27) is derived under the assumptions of fe > stand s2 > I,, and there
exist three other possibilities, depending on the set of parameters, even when the city has a single
residentialdistrict･ Besides we might have at most four residential districts within a city,and the
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identification of the signs of the above canonly explore a small part of the diversiBed solutions the
problem produces.
h the followlng Sections, wewill numerically explore the problem. One deficiency associated
with such an analysis is that a reader is notalways convinced if the results based on specific sets
of parameters are generalenough. However, the numeriCalanalyses will still helpunderstand the
nature of the solutions if the parameter values are carefully chosen to achieve su缶cient diversity.
4　The solution procedure
The problem formulatedinSection 2 is relatively complex thanit might have appeared. From
(10), the bid rent is afunction of tan( and utility. Accordingly the population isalso a function of
taxand utility･ However, the tax is a function of population from (4). Thus the structure of our





a b Cl l L&　&　&
where Ni indicates that not only the totalpopulation butalso its distribution is relevant.
(29-b)and (29-C) suggest that Tland T2gives the fixed points of respective equations when
U is exogenous to them. And when the fixed points are obtained, the tax values are plugged into
(291a) to determine U that satisfies the equation.
The di氏Culty associated with the solution procedure stems from two characteristics of the
model･ One is that the tax expression includes integral operations concerning population distri-
butions, and the other is that the number of residentialdistricts is notknOwn beforehand due to
negative externality from the facilities. Even without negative externalities, the rent gradient in the
multiple job centers (White (1976)) can either be positive or negative. When a resident expresses
strong dislike to the facility, by means of large 7, the vicinity of the facilities may remain vacant.
Formally, fLand I, are defined as the outmost distances where the rents are positive,
/2-imf(rIR(r) >0) and I, -sup(rlR(r) >01.
Aswe observe that the troughs of the bid rent curve on the interval(fe,I,) Will be observed only
at the sites of incinerators, the city in our model seems to have at most three segmented residential
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districts. In reality, the discontinuity of the bid rent curve, as a consequence of discontinuous
lump-sum taxes, possibly divide the city into fotu segments. Accordingly, there will be at most
eight even numbered fringes in the city, which bring about complexity to integrations.
In the present model, equatio/ns (29-b) and (29-C) are separable as the population distribution
inCity 2 will not affect the taxinCity 1. This is due to the fact that the externalities received by
a household in (5) depend only on the locations of facilities, butare independent of the quantities
of garbage trea.ted there. Thus given the utility level, these two equations tO determine equilibrium
taxes can be solved independently.
In short, We can construct the following procedure to solve the problemunder given locations
of incinera.tor sites, βl and β2.
(1) Arbitrarily choose U.
(2) Given U, obtain Tland T2 thatgive the fixed points for (29-b)and (29-C), respectively･ This
step, at the same time, determines the populations, Nl(Tl, U) and N2(7T2, U).
(3) Check whether (29-a) is satisfied. Otherwise choose new U that reduces the error from the total
Population,and repeat (2).
The essentialpoint is how to modifyU so as to reduce Nl(Tl, U) +N2(T2, U) - N. Numerically,
we can adopt variousalgorithms to approach the solutions of single variable nonlinear equations,
such as Dekkar's or Muller'Salgorithms. Or we can simply employ an unconstrainedminimization
teclmique regarding the squared error of populations. In any case, the problem can be solved in
the two phases, where the upper level problem is regarded as having U as the sole v打iable a8 TTi's
are solved as functions of Uinthe lower level.4
It must be noted that the above procedure is crucially depends on the specification of the utility
function (7), where the negative externalities are independent of the garbage treated at each site. In
other words, a household receives negative externality from the existence of the incinerator rather
than its level of operation, even when one of the cities disappears. This a5Sumption makes the
utility in one city is independent or the population in the other city 80 that the equations (29-b)
and (29-C) can be solved separately.
4To obtain the r6ults in thefo110wlng Sections, Mullerlsalgorithm to determine U is combinedwith an uncon-
strained minimizat.ion to detemine taxes.
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5　Numerical analysis
Our problem has essentially six parametersand eight exogenous variables. Specification of those
values is decisive in determlnlng the tfrban con五gurations of our twin city･ Some variables, such
as parameter α associated with the good consumption is likely to take a value between Oand 1.
The marginaltransport cost T Should be less than 4(1 - α)Y/1g, which is the level at whichall the
incomeallocated to non-good expenditure is spent on transportation by the households at the city
fringes when the two city centers of the identicalsize are spaced apart enoughto form separate
residential districts.
tloweverl there is no generalrule to determine a permissible range for each parameter and
v訂iable except for its sign･ If one tries to determine such a range on the ground of existence of
solutions, it is essentially the same aB tO identi& a set in the Euclidian space of 14 dimensions since
existence depends on the combination of the values of other parameters and variables.
Thus we here simply pick two values for the most of parametersand variables as listed in
Table l･ However, some of variables such as α,N,Y2,and F are fixed at O･5, 200, 100, and 1000,
respectively･5 Moreover, the two CBD)s arefiⅩed at the locations that are symmetric with respect
to the city boundary･ Instead, the locations of incinerators are moved a町mmetrically between 0
and士225 in a pitch of 25･ WefiⅩed the income in City 2 at 100, but the asymmetric case can be
considered by changing one in City 1, and the fixed cost F is set at ten times of personal income.6
Table 1: Values of parameters and exogenous variables for numeriCaltests.
α 途�♂ ���q �)｢�N 楓ﾂ�Y2 俑"�F 
0.5 ��紕�0.1 ��絣�0.025 ����R�200 涛��100 �#R�1000 
0.5 ���"�1.0 ����R�0.1 �100 �50 
SIn the previous s∝tion, We preclude diqerentiation with respect to α1 One reason is tha･t a appears aB the power
to the numericalexpressions, which derivatives ue relatively complicated, but the hidden reason is that its value is
crucialinterms of existence of solutions. For example, when α - 0.3, most combinations result in no existence of
solution5.
6It must be noted that p'or,T,Yt,and F are associatedwith the monetaryunit･ They may beinvariantwith
respect to monetary denominations･ Thc丘xed cost of an incinerator appeaqs cheap, but it is reasonable when the
populationunit is a thousand･ Thus the population or the locations of the CBD arealso related to the monetary
denomination.
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In-sum, we have five parameters and v打iables that take twoalternative values, and tenal-
ternative locations are considered for each of incinerators. In other words, 100 pairs of locations
are considered,and our numericalanalysis includes the totalof 12,800 cases. However, existence
of a solution is not guaranteed in our problem, and we find that only ll,222 0f them lead to the
numeriCalsolutions. Figure 1 shows a typicalcase how discontinuityinrent curves is related to
those non-existence cases.7
Figure 1: Existence of solutionS and discontinuity in rent curves.
Two rent curves corresponding to the utility levels of 2.20091 and 2.0089 are depicted in Figure
l･ While the curvesinCity 2 arealmost identical for both utility levels, those in City lare quite
different. While the combined population for U - 2.20091 is 191.52, that for U - 2.20089 jumps up
to 275･73,and there is no utility level that satisfies Nl + N2 - 200 in-between. Such discontinuity
arises from the tax to cover the fixed cost of the incinerator. If the first household migrates into
City 1, it should bear the entire fixed cost so that they cannot enjoy the utility level if it continues
to live in City 2･8
Tbble 2 shows the partial results regarding existence or solutions. Three panels correspond to
the different specifications of exogenous variables, Yland ei. The first two panels show the cases
7Figure 1 is based on the following set of parameters and exogenous wiables1 7 - 014,6 = 011,p = 015,0 =
0.05,T- 0.05,Yl - 100,21 - j=50,S1 - -50,and s2 - 125.
8This discontinuity disappears uJlder the absence of the丘Xed cost･ However, spatialdiscontinuity of the rent
curves at the city boundarywill persist unl鰯both the locations ofincinera.torsand the incomes paid at each CBD
are symmetric.
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where theincome levels are identicalbetween two CBD's while the last one shows the case where
the income paid in City 1 is lO% lower. Each cell of the panels identifies a specific combination of
the iminerator locations (sl, S2).
Aswe consider twoalternative values for five parameters, each cell is relevant tO 32 cases. The
first number identifies the number of cases, out of 32, for which the numericalsolutionsare obtained.
Apparently, when both sites are near the city boundary, the chance of existence tends to increase.
There are two numbers in parentheses. The first one is the number of relevant solutions with the
totalpopulation concentrates in either of the cities while the second one indicates the number of
solutionS With both incinerators sits outside the residential districts, Or are not su汀Ounded by the
residential districts.
Asmight be expected, the solutions for the cases with the asymmetricincomes have higher
chance of ending up in the concentration to the city with higher income･ When the two CBD's are
nearer (ei -土25), the population is split between two cities in many cases as seeninpanel (C).
However, the realmwith scattered population shrinks when the CBD's are far apart (ei - j=50),
where only a few caseswith the incinera･tor of City 2 being located farther from the city boundary
results in the scattered population. However, in all of such solutions, the CBD with the lower
income fail to hire its residents, viz･all the residents commute to the CBD with higherincome.
As for the second numbersinthe parentheses,the cities naturally locate between the two
incinerators when they locate farther from the boundary･ If the locations are symmetric and
households reside continuouslyI Vi2;･ Without leaving vacant land, the outer fringes will be 100
distanceunits apart･ Due to the negative externality, their locations must be 250 units apart
for the cities being located between the two incinerators when ei -土50. This distance will be
shortened to 225 when the two CBD'Sare nearer at ei - i25. It is well known that existence of
negative externalities makes the cities less compact, and our problem is no exception
Figure 2 shows four examples of typicalurban configurations, which demonstrate different
modes of the cities･ Panel (a) represents the rent curve of a city of mode 1, where the population
is concentrated to City 2 that offers higher income･ While both incinerators are located at the city
boundary, the one belonging to City 1 does not operate, but its丘xed cost cannot be recovered.
Mode 2 might be the mostfrequently observed configuration, for both equaland unequalincome
cases･ Panel (b) is based on the same set of parameters andincinerator sites except for the identical
income･ The resulting con丘guration is quite diLferentfrom the one in Panel (a) that we haNe the
perfectly symmetric twin cities.
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Table 2: Existence of solutions by the incinerator locations.
ノ　(a)ei-士50andY1-100
0 �3"��ﾃ���32(0,0) �3"ィﾃ���32(4,0) �3"ィﾃ���32(8,0) �3"ィﾃ���32(0,0) �3���ﾃ���
-25 �3"��ﾃ���30(0,0) �3"��ﾃ���31(0,0) �3���ﾃ���31(0,0) �3"��ﾃ���31(0,0) �3���ﾃ���
-50 �3"ィﾃ���32(Ol,o) �3"��ﾃ���32(0,0) �3���ﾃ���30(0,0) �3"��ﾃ���31(0,0) �#ｃBﾃ���
-75 �3"ィﾃ���31(0,0) �3"��ﾃ���32(0,0) �3��2ﾃ���30(4,0) �3"��ﾃ���30(2,4) �3�ッﾃB��
-100 �3"ィﾃ���30(0,0) �3���ﾃ���31(3,0) �#b��ﾃ���28(0,0) 偵#2��ﾃ�r��28(1,17) �#茶Rﾃ�b��
-125 �3"モﾃ���31(0,0) �3���ﾃ���30(4,0) �#ｃ�ﾃ���27(0,27) �#茶�ﾃ#鋳�27(0,27) �#r�2ﾃ#���
-150 �3"ィﾃ���32(0,0) �3"��ﾃ���32(0,0) �#2��ﾃ�r��29(0,29) �#ｃ�ﾃ#ｒ�28(0,28) �3���ﾃ3���
-175 �3"��ﾃ���31(0,0) �3���ﾃ���30(2,4) �#ｃ�ﾃ�r��27(0,27) �#ｃ�ﾃ#ｒ�26(0,26) �#ｃ�ﾃ#ｒ�
-200 �3���ﾃ���30(0,0) �#茶Bﾃ���30(6,4) �#茶Rﾃ�b��27(3,20) �3���ﾃ3���28(0,28) �#B��ﾃ#B��
(b) ei =土25 and Yl - 100
0 �3"��ﾃ���32(0,0) �3�ィﾃ���32(4,0) �3"ィﾃ���28(4,0) �3"ィﾃ���32(0,0) �3���ﾃ���
-25 �3"��ﾃ���28(0,0) �3���ﾃ���29(0,0) �#茶�ﾃ���26(0,0) �3���ﾃ���31(0,0) �3���ﾃ���
-50 �3�ィﾃ���30(0,0) �#茶�ﾃ���30(0,0) �#茶�ﾃ���29(0,0) �3���ﾃ���32(0,0) �3�ィﾃ���
-75 �3"ィﾃ���29(0,0) �3���ﾃ���26(0,0) �#B��ﾃ���27(0,0) �#b��ﾃ���28(2,4) �#ｃBﾃR��
-100 �3"ィﾃ���29(0,0) �#茶�ﾃ���24(0,0) �#���ﾃ���21(0,2) �#2��ﾃ�ｒ�26(0,20) �#R�"ﾃ�R��
-125 �#ｃBﾃ���26(0,0) �#茶�ﾃ���27(0,0) �#���ﾃ"��20(0,20) �#B��ﾃ#B��26(0,26) �#b��ﾃ#"��
-150 �3"ィﾃ���30(0,0) �3���ﾃ���26(0,0) �#2��ﾃ�ｒ�24(0,24) �#B��ﾃ#B��26(0,26) �#b��ﾃ#b��
-175 �3"��ﾃ���31(0,0) �3"��ﾃ���28(2,4) �#b��ﾃ#���26(0,26) �#b��ﾃ#b��24(0,24) �#B��ﾃ#B��
-200 �3���ﾃ���30(0,0) �3�ィﾃ���28(4,5) �#R�"ﾃ�R��26(1,22) �#b��ﾃ#b��24(0,24) �#B��ﾃ#B��
(C) ei -土25andY1 -90
0 �3"モﾃ���32(4,0) �#ｃづ���28(10,0) �#Bモﾃ���18(2,0) �#b�"ﾃ���30(2,0) �3"��ﾃ���
-25 �3"�#�ﾃ���32(16,0) �3"��bﾃ���32(16,0) �#Bモﾃ���16(0,0) �#茶�Bﾃ���24(2,0) �3���ﾃ���
-50 �3"��bﾃ���32(12,0) �3"�#�ﾃ���31(19,0) �#B��"ﾃ���21(5,0) �#茶づ���27(4,3) �#r��ﾃ�ｒ�
-75 �3"�#2ﾃ���32(20,0) �3"�#2ﾃ���30(25,0) �#B��rﾃ���17(5,0) �#ｃ�BﾃB��25(5,19) �#2�2ﾃ#���
-100 �3"�#づ���32(18,0) �3"�#"ﾃ���30(22,0) �#"ヲﾃ���17(1,0) �#�ヲﾃB��26(6,20) �#Bモﾃ�b��
-125 �3"�#�ﾃ���31(15,0) �3"��bﾃ���30(14,0) �#"ッﾃ���16(1,0) �#�コﾃ�b��23(4,19) �#R��ﾃ#R��
-150 �3"��bﾃ���31(15,0) �3���Rﾃ���30(14,0) �#"ッﾃ���18(1,4) �#2ッﾃ�R��21(0,21) �#R��ﾃ#R��
-175 �3"��bﾃ���31(16,0) �3"�#�ﾃ���30(20,0) �#B��"ﾃ���16(4,1) �#Rビﾃ�"��25(4,19) �#b��ﾃ#b��
-200 �3"�3"ﾃ���32(22,0) �3"�#bﾃ���30(26,0) �#B��づ���18(8,0) �#b���ﾃｒ�27(6,17) �#2��ﾃ#"��
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Mode 3 isalSo observedfrequently, particularly whenincomesare identical. In Panel (C), the
incinerator divides the residential打ea in City 1. It is interesting that even if City 1 has placed its
incinerator amidst the residential area, it attracts more population than City 2, whid displaces
it to the remote area･ Discontinuity of the rent function at the city boundary arises from the
population gap between the two cities, i･e･, N1 - 153･5and N2 = 46･5･ Consequently, the tax is
three times expensiveinCity 2 to support its facility.
In contraLSt tO modes 1 through3, node 4 is extremely rare and observed only four times out
of ll,222 caBeS･ Thoughdi氏Cult to see from panel (d), City l's residentialdistricts spannot from
-101･8 t0 -35･89, and from -6･90 t0 -0.75.AsCity 2's residentialdistrict starts from 0, a small strip
between -0･75and 0 remains vacant. This gap is caused by the same reason aB above, vi2;. Smaller
population, and thus higher tax, in City 2.
Before concluding this sectionI We Summarize how the locations of incinerators will affect the city
configtuations･ Table 3 Shows the average mode of the city for Selected combinations of incinerator
sites,incomes, and the CBD loca･tions･ In parallel with Table 2, the averages are calculated for the
possible 32 solutions corresponding to each cell.
lt is obvious that panels (a) and (b) become symmetric with respect to their diagonalelements.
When both incomesand the CBD locations are symmetric, the urbanconfiguration will be themir-
ror image of each other for the citieswith the interchanged incinerator sites. There is no particular
rule on whether the diagonalelements are larger or smaller thanthe off-diagonals. However, we
ca･n safely say that the mode will be larger when incinerators locate adjacent to the CBD'S, and
smaller when they locate outside the cities.
Panel (C) corresponds to the case With unequalincomes. In this case, the incinerator location
of the city with the lower income does not demonstrate much in且uence on the urbanconfiguration,
and City 2 is decisive in this regard. The property that the mode will decrease as the incinerator
being displaced farther from the city boundary is still valid･ But it must be noted that the reliability
of the averages are not equalas the numbers of solutions, on which the averages based, vary from
32to16.
6　Statistical analysis
In the above, we see that our model generates variety of urbanconfigurations,and switching
between them occurs discontinuously･ This makes it impracticalto conduct comparative statics
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(a) 7-0.4,6-0.1,p- 0.5,q-0.025,T =0.05,Y1 -90,ei = ±50, and sl - S2 -0.
(b)7-0･4,6-0.1,p=0.5,q=0.025,T-0.05,Y1 -100,ei =土50, andsl -S2=0.
m汀
(C) 7-0･4,6-0.2,p- 0.5,q -0.05,T- 0.1,Yl = 100,2. - ±50.S1 - -125, and s2 =200.
(d) 7 -0.4,6-0.2,p= 0.5,q = 0.05,T -0.1,Y1 - 100,ei -土50,S1 - -25, and s2 = 50.
Figure 2: Sample urbancon丘gurations (modes 1 through4).
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Table 3: Average mode of the city byincinerator sites.
ノ(a)et-土50andY1-100
0 �"�����2.000 �"紊3��2.625 ��繝sR�1.750 ��繝sR�2.000 �"�����
-25 �"�����2.533 �2��c2�3.000 �"纉32�2.419 �"�#S��2.258 �"緜cr�
-50 �(�ｳC3��3.063 �2�����3.000 �"纉c��2.533 �"紊3��2.710 �"縱�B�
-75 �"緜#R�3.000 �2�����3.000 �"纉�2�-2.267 �"�3sR�2.400 �"經32�
-100 ��繝sR�2.933 �"纉c��2.903 �2�����2.143 ��綰sb�2.321 �"��c��
-125 ��縱S��2.419 �"經32�2.267 �"��C2�1.000 ��縱�2�1.741 �"�����
-150 ��繝sR�2.250 �"紊3��2.375 ��緜澱�1.793 �������2.000 �"�����
-175 �"�����2.258 �"縱���2.400 �"�3#��1.741 �"�����1.308 �"�����
-200 �"�����2.667 �"緜���2.533 �"��c��2ー000 �"�����2.000 ���332�
(b) C. =土25 and Y1 - 100
0 �"�����2.188 �"經�b�2.500 ��繝sR�1.857 ��繝sR�2.000 �"�����
-25 �"��モ�2.857 �2�����3.000 �"�#C��2.231 �"�#���2.258 �"經cr�
-50 �"經�b�3.000 �2�����2.900 �"紊�B�2.310 �"�##b�2.250 �"�3ビ�
-75 �(�ｳS���3.000 �"纉���3.000 �"紊�r�2.259 �"���"�1.964 �"��3b�
-100 ��繝sR�2.241 �"紊�B�2.417 �2�����2.000 ���3C��1.462 ��緜���
-125 ��繝Sr�2.231 �"�3���2.259 �"�����1.000 �������1.000 ���3Cb�
-150 ��繝sR�2.200 �"�##b�2.192 ���3C��1.000 �������1.000 �������
-175 �"�����2.258 �"�#S��1.964 ��紊c"�1.000 �������1.000 ����cr�
-200 �"�����2.567 �"�3ビ�2.036 ��緜���1.346 �������1.167 �������
(C) 2. - j=25 and Yl = 90
0 ��縱S��2.375 �"縱�B�2.643 �"緜cr�2.722 �"�#3��2.067 �"�����
-25 ���3sR�2.313 �"�#S��2.063 �"�#S��2.750 �"��3B�2.000 �"�����
-50 ��經���2.125 �"�����2.000 �"�����2.000 �"�����1.889 ���332�
-75 ���#���2.125 �"�����2.000 �"�����2.000 ��繝Sr�1.240 白��3��
-100 ����#R�2.188 �"�����2.000 �"�����2.000 ��繝���1.231 ���332�
-125 ���3sR�2.258 �"�����2.000 �"�����2.000 ���#3��1.174 �������
-150 ��經���2.194 �"�����2.000 �"�����1.778 ���3C��1.000 �������
-175 ��經���2.258 �"�����2.000 �"�����1.938 ��經#��1.240 �������
-200 �������2.188 �"�����2.000 �"�����2.000 ��緜�"�1.370 ����C2�
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inananalyticalmanner, but we cannot learnnuchfromfragmentalresultsfron the numerical
analysis･ Accordingly we need to work out a way to derive some generalcharacteristics of the
solutions.
Most real-world problemsare complex enoughto prevent us from obtaining concrete qualitative
results･ One may be tempted to oversimplifythe model to obtain the deterministic results, but
suchanattitude isunhealthy･ We believe it is not meaningless to tell whether some policy, such as
transport improvement, tends to improve household's utility or not･ Ando and Kakimoto (1995)
proposed the way to transform the comparative statics a.nalysis into statisticalhypothesis testing.
In our previous study, we generate sets of parametersand exogcnous wiables randomly over the
prescribed intervals,and calculated the endogenous v打iables. The ranks of endogenous variables
and those of parameters are compared by testing Kendall's rank correlation coeBcients･9 In our
present model, we cannot specifythe appropriate ranges for most parameters and variables. Thus
we here choose to test the similar hypotheses by uSlng the property that binomial proportions
aBymPtOtical1y follow the standard normaldistribution.
In our case, We consider five parameters and two exogenous variables that take either of two
values, the highand the low, aB Well as the 100 combinations of incinerator sites. When we categorize
the solutions by the level of exogenous variables, Yl and ei, each category has the maximum of
3,200 relevant SOlutions･ Suppose we choose one particularpair of a parameterandanendogenous
variable, rand U for example,and denote the utility level as a function of the parametersgiven
exogenous variables, U(7, 6, p, U, T, 81 , S2rei, Yl). Then we will have either of the following,
U(7,6,p,U,T - high,sl,S2lei,Yl) <　U(7,6,p,U,T - low,sl,S2lei,Yl),　(30-a)
U(7,6,p,U,T - high,sl,S2lei,Yl) ≧　U(7,6,p,U,T - low,sl,S2lei,Yl),　(30-b)
provided that both of relevant solutions exist. There will be up to 1,600 comparisons are possible
for each pair chosen.
Let nU and苑U denote the number of solution pairs for which comparisonsare possible and
the pairs that satisfy(301a), respectively. Then the binomialproportion that the higher value
of T results in the lower utility value isgiven by允/ - hU/nU. The binomial proportion pu
9The problem is on compariSons among v打iotlS tax schemes to Gnance transport improvement･ With only seven
paLrameterS and exogenous -主ables, it has smaller degree offreedom. Besides, isomorphism among those parameters
is relatively clear so that we can speci& the intervalswithollt loss of generality.
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asymptotically follows the normaldistribution with the standard error 3p - Vi3U(1 - PU)/nU.
pU～NuiU,3p) or撃～JV捗U,1)
qp
Whether the parameter T makes the utility U decrease, it su瓜ces to check if the binomial





which asymptoticalIyfollows the standard normaldistribution. Then we canappealto a single-
sided test against the null hypothesis, Ho :zU - 0･ 10
Table 4 list those test statistics regarding every combination offive parameters and seven
endogenousⅤ訂iables･ For example, when ei -土50and Y1 - 100, we find zU - 136.96from panel
(a)･ This is highly significant and zu < 0,and thus dU/dT < 0 is accepted. nU is the number
of comparisons established when the targeted endogenous variable is U･ While U is accompanied
by the largest number of effective comparisons, the smallest number is observed with Tl. The
difference is not so large when the two cities olrer the same income, but only a small number of
comparisons are possible when the incomes are unequal.ll Thus in most cases, Wemight regard
the number of observations are nearly infinite, and the asymptotic condition applies. The rejection
limits for the single-sided test aregiven by 2.58 at 0.5%, 2.33 at 1%, 1.96 at 2.5%,and 1.65 at 5%.
The extremely significant zu values inall panels are backed up by the fact thatall the eaective
comparisons result in smaller U for higher T･ These observations suggest the possibility of analytical
proof of this property･ However, as for the population, the belief is not likely. Both dNl/dT < 0
and dN2/dT < 0 are predicted by panels (a) and (b), they are barely significant in that 54% of
comparisons were found to reduce Nl and N2, but 46% reached the opposite results. In fact, it
is not logically possible that pop山ations of both cities cannot decrease simultaneously under the
丘Ⅹed total population.
It might be felt a little strange that increase in T tends to reduce the taxes in both cities, though
not very signifiCant･ This canbe explained as follows. The increase in transport costwill make the
city compact, and the cost of garbage coIIectionfrom a compact city is cheaper thanina dispersed
10Asp0 - 0･5 is regarded as the true value, the standard error must be calculated for that value. When we jtJSt
waLnt tO Check whether pu ≠ 0.5, a double-sided test based on x2 distribution is also availaLble.
llThis phenomenon is peculiarwith Tl･ Regarding the rest oE the exogenous variables, the numbers of effective
compariSons are dmost equivalent to that of U.
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Table 4:Asymptotic test statistics for comparative statics.
(aL) e. -土50 and Y1 - 100
7 蔦32紊b�-5.38 蔦R��r�3.89 �2縱2�-10.29 澱��r�1436 ��3���
∂ �3B緜��_4.22 蔦B��b�-8.22 蔦ゅ#r�7.26 蔦��經r�1404 ��3S��
P 蔦3r繝r�-6.34 蔦b��r�34.34 �3B紊B�4.38 蔦��緜"��1434 ��3釘�
〃■ 蔦3b纉��-3.14 蔦2��B�17.57 ��r經��0.76 蔦2�3��1368 ��#釘�
丁 蔦3b纉b�-3.25 蔦"繝��_2.51 蔦"緜"�2.65 蔦B緜R�1366 ��#ッ�
(b)ei=士25andYl =100
7 蔦3B��"�-4.82 蔦B繝"�3.53 �2經R�-ll.63 途紊��1349 ��3�b�
6 �32縱"�-3.50 蔦2�32�-6.58 蔦b緜��8.37 椿ﾆﾂ�32�1277 ��#32�
P 蔦3b�#��-5.48 蔦R經B�33.87 �32纉��5.59 崩ﾆﾂ�#"�1317 ��#���
q 蔦3B繝r�-2.93 蔦"繝r�16.58 ��b緜b�0.63 蔦"繝��1216 ���c��
丁 蔦3B��b�-2.61 蔦"經R�-2.82 蔦(�ｳs��2.90 蔦B縱r�1167 ������
(C) 21 -土50 and Yl =90
7 蔦3b經��-33.47 蔦3b紊��-5.52 �#偵�"�-21.99 �#r�3"�1353 鼎R�
∂ �3b�#��-36.28 蔦3�纉��4.69 蔦3b��b�-31.98 蔦3"�#��1316 �#"�
P 蔦3b纉r�-36.38 蔦3B紊2�4.99 �3b纉r�-34.32 蔦3B紊2�1367 鉄R�
q 蔦3R紊B�-31.02 ��ｳ3R�#b�0.43 �3R紊2�-35.31 蔦3R�3��1255 �#"�
丁 蔦3R�#b�-32.42 蔦3B��"�3.16 蔦3�緜2�-34.12 蔦3B����1243 ����
(d) e. - j=25 and Yl = 90
7 蔦3B��r�-1.56 蔦#r��b�-15.64 �#偵�b�-23.44 湯纉B�1296 都C"�
∂ �3R��2�-18.09 蔦B繝2�7.44 蔦#偵#r�-0.42 椿ﾆﾂ緜��1255 田3��
P 蔦3R緜r�-25.10 蔦R�#��22.33 �3R緜��_1.51 椿ﾆﾂ經"�1280 都Sb�
q 蔦3B�#R�-2.19 蔦�ゅC��-3.04 �3"�3"�-18.37 蔦�ゅcb�1173 田�r�
丁 蔦3"纉R�14.75 蔦#r繝b�-6.52 蔦b縱B�-26.28 蔦#ゅcR�1086 �#sB�
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city･ When the cities become compacts, their fringes will approach the city boundary so that we
have dfe/dT > 0 and df,/dT < 0･
The increase in the cost of garbage collection q is expected to have essentially the same effect,
but dfe/dq - 0 is accepted while df,/dq < 0 is significant from panels (a) and (b)･ In both cases,
dfc is increased by 51%, and df, is decreased by 54%･ As these two panels represent the symmetric
cases, it is appropriate to regard such a difference aB the computationalerrors, but rejection of
df, - 0 is acceptable at least from the ground of minimizing the type I errors･ In general, We
have the mixed results regarding the eaects of the parameters when回< 10, and the results are
c_eftainly one-sided when lzl > 30･ Thus we can brieay recognize the'directions and signiacance of
the parameters on the endogenous variables丘･om the table･
panels (C) and (d) represent the asymmetric cases with the unequalincomes･ In the former, the
statistics concerning Tl, the tax for the city with lower income, are not meaningful with the very
limited numbers of comparisons being possible.Aside from this observationI we canimmediately
recogmi2=e that the aBymptOtic statistics are quite diLferentfrom those in the symmetric case,and
the locations of the CBDIs greatly affect the results even within the symmetric ca5eS･Asthe
combination of exogenous variables employed in panel (C) tends to produce somewhat peculiar
solutionS except When gl and 82 are large, we here concentrate on panel (d)･
Wefirst observe dTl/d6 < 0 and dTl/dq > 0 in panel (b) while they have opposite signs in
panel (d). 6 represents the distance decays from the incinerators･ When the negative externality
diminishes faster, the city will be compact in the symmetric case･ The fact that the tax will
increase when City 1 offers the lower income canbe understood as follows･ The decrease in 6 more
severely affect the population in City 1,and such decrease will increase the丘xed cost shared by the
remaining households. However, when we consider the fact that 41% of the solutions in panel (d)
are having the concentrated population in City 2, the results concerning City I might be derived
from somewhat skewed set. of solut.ions.
Secondly it is interesting to point out that the increase in T would make the residential districts
shi氏towards the city with the lower income instead of making them compact, and the same is true
with the increase in q. Similarly, we canObserve many properties regarding comparative statics,
and the properties that might be proved analytically can be identified from the highly significant I
statistics. However, such a criterion is not perfect if we see panel (C)･ Many of the results appear to
be highly significant, but we learn that those observations are sofragi1e that cannot be maintained
when the distance between two CBD's are shorter.
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7　Tbwards the optimal site selection
So far we discussed how changes in parameters and exogenous variables affect the endogenous
variables. In short-run, however, sudden changes in nationalpopulation or their preference is
unlikely, and tlms a planner may regard those parameters as thegiven conditions. Then his/her
problem is to choose the best locations of the incinerators. Naturally, the word best is associated
with certain value judgment, but in our model, We can simply emplqy the equilibrium utility level
for t.he measurement.
Figure 3 shows the utility surface concerning the incinerator locations, where the vertical and
hori2:Ontalaxesindicate the sites in Cities 1 and 2, respectively. All the panelsare based on the
same set of parameters, (7,6,p,0.,T) - (0.5,0.1,1.0,0.025,0.1), but City l's income leveland the
CBD locations are diversified.
Aspanels (a)and (b) represent the symmetric cases with the different CBD locations･ The isか
utility contours natl汀ally become symmetric with respect to the 45o line･ Each panel has a number
of local peaks and troughs. The highest utility iS achieved when both cities locate their incinerators
at distance 150fron the boundary. Under these incinerator locations, the urban fringes are located
at distance lOOfrom the boundary, and thus, the relevant configuration has nO incinerators inside
the residential area. As such a con丘guration i5 the one to house the population in the most compact
manner, the equilibrium utility becomes naturally high. The utility level of 2.1986 for ei - ±50 is
reduced to 2.1830 a5 the distance between the two CBD's is halved.
When the incomes areunequal in the two cities, the utility surface changes drastically. With the
either of incinerators located near the city boundary, the population is concentrated in City 2, the
city offering the higher income. A deep and wide valley of utility appears when City l's incinerator
is located around its CBD. This valley isalSo associated with the population concentration. The
two peaks are found when City l's incinerator is located su氏ciently far from the city boundary,
and the maximum utility is achieved for (sl,S2) - (-150,225). 12 The fact that the contours tend
to parallel to the horizontal axis indicate that the utility level is relatively insensitive to the City
2's incinerator location as far as panel (C) is concerned. This can be understood from the fact that
the City l's incinerator location is decisive in its existence, and whether City 1 can hold population
or not will deeply affect the utility level.
12Note that this is not an interior solution so that a better solution may exist beyond our computationalarea･
Similarly aS the symmetric cases, the highest utility is achieved when both incinerators are located outside the
residential area.
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Here we consider the case as if the o缶cialSfrom the two cities collaborate to determine the
locations of incinerators so aS tO maXimi2ie the utility level common to their residents. Alternatively,
One may consider the location game framework. Similar to the Hotelling's model, residents cannot
leave the beach, and must purchase the garbage collection service inaninelastic manner. However,
unlike Hotelling, each city's market area is predetermined irrespective of its incinerator location,
but the residents canmovefreelyalong the beach･ 13
Because the cities are not closed, the utility could not be the objective for the policy maker in
each city. The govemment's net tax revenue could not be the one either a5 there will be no excess
revenue by assumption. Then the population might serve as the payoff of each player when the
policy goalof many municipalities in the realworld appears to be the population maximization･
Asthe matter of coIDSe, there is no guarantee that the equilibrium of the location game based on
population maximi名ation coincides with the solution to attain the maximum utility. This type of
approadl is left for thefutWe research.
So far we assume that each city is required to buildanincinerator for its residents. However,
it may be ineBcient when the scale economy exists. One canapply a simple framework similar to
Krugman's model on丘rm location and urban growth (e.g. Bogart (1998), chap･7) to the question
whether the two cities should provide service jointly, and if this is the case, Where the facility should
be located. h the case of joint provision, the tax is to be calculated from the service cost to cover
the entire population
Suppose Tl and TTl are the taxes when the service is provided independently, and To is the tax
for the joint service. Then (TTo I Tl)Nl and (To - T2)N2 Canbe regarded aB the transfer (subsidy
or negative tax) between two cities if the population distribution is unchanged in both schemes
(thoughit isunlikely).Asthe facility in concernemits negative externality, the rich city may
choose to pay some money to the poor city asking the latter to build the facility that is capable
of incinerating garbage from the former together. This canbe a game involving transfer payment.
Then the strategy will be: (1) whether to build a facility to incinerate own garbage, (2) build a
facility to incinerate combined garbage while receiving transfer payment, (3) not to build a facility
and pay transfer payment. Each strategy involves the determination of transfer amountand/or
location of the facility.
Traditionally, the public facilities have heavily been studied by urban economists. However,
13Therewill be ine瓜:iency accrued from the触ed cost of the incinerator when the city is abandoned. In our
framework, this is not really a sunk cost as the city caLn avoid it when no one expresses his/herwill to live there.
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only a limited number of existing studies consider the NIMBY facilities in the spatialcontext･ The
problem considered in this paper is quite simple, yet its solutionsare complicated enoughthat
their qualitative characteristics are indeterminate depending on glVen parameters and exogenous
variables. Some peoplemight consider a good model is the one that can produce concrete results･
However, the reality is much complex,andgiven that complexity, it is reasonable to state the
findings in the probabilistic way･ It is hoped that the present paper managed to provide a practical
tool to organize the diversified results due to complexity･ AfterallI Ours is a type of problems that
urban planners should face in daily work･
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也 �*ﾓ��G"��X����爾�亡> < - �*ﾓ��GG"�ﾒ�く> 1一 一 ��｢�而G"�耳爾�く> tr ■- �*ﾓ����G"��ｲ�○ tr ▼■一 �*ﾓ��G"�ﾒ�く> 一tr - �*ﾓ��G"��W��の rr> ー �*ﾘ��爾���耳,"�ﾒ�の ■■1 ▼- ������ｲ�の 一つ ▼- �*ﾖ��g'ﾒ���ﾒ�く> I I ����"��W��⊂> tr - �*ﾓ��ﾂ��Rﾒ�⊂> ■tr ー■一 �*ﾓ����G"���ﾒ�く> 1r ▼~ �*ﾓ��G"��Rﾒ�く> tr ー 
■ 優｣��LL} < �6r����○○ 1ー �ｨ爾�I- Ln 汎B�○○ �*ﾓ��ﾂ�1ー 幽自�｢�O tr 宥"�～ V �6���ｲ�I l∫} �9��罵 �,ﾂ�ト■ I �,ﾂ�tD LL} 優｣��ﾄﾃ��く> LL7 �｢�ﾒ�～ eq 
令 汎ﾃr�r�LL7 tr �52�▼- 一つ 優｣�����くh ～ �,ﾂ��ﾂﾒ�○○ �6���ｲ�l∫} ��ｸ�ｲ�ﾈ耳爾�の ～ ��ｸ�ｲ����〇〇 一q 辻�n ー■■ 問���く■ー rq �*ﾓ��G"�の < ��ｸ�ｲ��������ﾂ�の ～ 秒����Lh ～ 宥"�tJ> Ln 
雌 �6rﾒ�''ﾒ�ド 一一} �6��egﾒ�ド ーけ �6����ト一 一ql �6x爾�耳ﾔ��ト一 m �6��,ﾂ�ト■ ーq 優｣��耳8ﾘ�ｲ�ト 一一1 �6r�ed��ト ーq �6��耳,"�ド rr> �6r���卜一 一q �6り�����耳爾�ト rr} �6���ｷ#��ド ー一つ 綿�(����ｷ��ド ーq �6���ｷ��tD tq 
曹 ～ 拓 僮 ○○ @ JJ TT ≠ 田 i U 港 - 醍 白�wb�+���"�G���"�屍�-��U��ﾒ�^��J EE 蘇 托l ≠ i 唾 咲 蘇 ～ 魯 幽而B�T�����R�ｼ"�+��ﾘﾂ��｢���l t=l t○ 傭 ～ 醍 外 E I一 日 昏 k F 問���TR����"�ｶ���R��R�����ﾅfﾂ�ｿ2����ｲ�R�I 鳴�ﾆR�H�(爾�■～ ? ○○ I 旺l ･K tK ≠ 莱 tS ≠ 《 i * a 毎 k EE 班������"�ｹ��Nr�Xub�T ｡○ ド 軸 外 ♯ 髄 ⊥1 ≠ i E 普 垂 ･Ⅲ 練 稗�H�(爾��ｨ���7�����<R��"��ﾂ�U｢�B��"��2���������ｹ��}���"�2�帚�l■一 一ヽ一 I tJI ～ M tヽl * e ド ≠ IL 叶 ≠ ･K 良 噛 川 蘇 罷 ･K 鳴�F��D｣�����2��"�ﾆﾂ��"�(r�｢�u���"��2�R��｢�8�����個�ﾚ��† く■一 鳴��ｨ�｢�耳����"�I- † ～ I- tヽ一 E 鵬 t- ≠ 【コ ･∃ ≠ 《 定 番 鰹 良 A 僻 粧 �.r�H�ｲ�ﾇ#��]�ﾒ�ﾄr��"�帚�u��y����-�����Lr�ｻ��ー■ l r- 一▼I 令 帳 樵 ≠ 良. i .■J TT ･Al 粒 i 畦 ��������.r�T��ur���~ﾂ��"�3��ﾅ��ｹ��d��繒�T ○ tD 白�H�����<■■ ��■I ーヽ一 計一 七 僻 iE J1 良一 拒 ≠l J} ■一 ■..∫ 傅ﾈ爾�H璽�����"�^r�ﾗ"ﾒ����ｲ�e｢��&ﾂ�｣2�������ｲ�
I 守 一> lJ ≠ 世 壕 ≠ 《 聖 戻 煤 ��r������&���"��2�j��Vb�酊���劔勍∃ 慕 粧 ≠ な せ # 義 蘇 a 4托 柾 �6ぴ��"�ｽ��｢��"��2�R�酊�6や�ﾚ��ｯB�Dｲ�ﾆﾂ�劔∃ ≠ 旺 群 ｣1 外 米 i 鰭 響 蘇 # 丿�����"�;R�y2��"��2�����ｵb����X��% 紘 ♯ 托l ≠ a 皮 i 嚢 ～ 拒 ∃ 轟 ����萋｢�����R�g��餝�^��ｹ��8��*ﾒ�ｭ��8��X蔗�ｧ��
TF=一. 欝写 要一 凾ｭ> 〇〇 一■ �*ﾓ��G"����く> u一 一 �*ﾓ��H�ｲ�く> ～ �*ﾓ�����くさ く> ー �*ﾓ��G��く> 一一I �*ﾓ�����ﾒ�く> LL> ���耳爾�������の �*ﾓ��*ﾘ*��○○ ��ｲ��"�LL> ～ �'��○ ド ��ｲ���SS 册3��ﾂ�8 一■} 唐�g��8 fV) ��ﾂ��,ﾂ���
* 巣 如 拙 剳I 或 a # �2��ﾂ�����軸 a i 鴨 島 I 泥B�2�2�ｩｲ�8r���鮮 負 負 # �2�k��5����<Ⅱ 守 i 鶴 島 l 刎��ﾆ"������8r���<D S i 鴨 島 I ��uR�����-��8r���<D 頭 i 鶴 義 I 滴8ﾒ�����ｩｲ�8r���中 頭 i 鶴 巳. 4 l 刎��(����-��F"��nr�ﾂ�# 盟 負 卦 泥B�2�2�-��8r�ﾂ�和 忠 # 鴨 ど. tb I 儺��k������和 男 A 暢 ヒ三. 一l l 仗������-��e2��帚���如 意 i 鴨 島 l �(b�:｢������8r���# 負 育 a 儺��k��5����肘 盟 点 a 豫ﾂ�k����
近 QP 出 A 冤 も 八 ヰI 八 I =ヽ 令 13 ノ■ 勺 .n 白�}��J｢�9�爾�J｢���ﾘ�"�}��ｬ6����s駝ﾂ�l も 八 ヰJ 麦 白�.��J｢�9�｢�y��l も 八 ヰJ 糞 白�}��J｢�9�｢��r�班 ,,L y 盟 ヰ ��b�>ﾂ�b�9��｢��*ﾒ�陲�I も 八 ヰJ S 世 已. 初 ～ 定 白�.����裵ﾂ�J｢���ﾘ�"�V"�����Kﾒ�地 建 肝 要 4 1J ) 令 A ヰJ 八 l =ヽ 令 儉r��ﾒ�ﾖ"�斤�>ﾂ���9��守 南 S 結 睦�����������.����9�爾�2�I も 八 ヰ一 八 I 白�}��J｢�u貭�J｢�ﾂ�ﾘ�"�}��V��ｼ"�# 蘇 i 4 1J l 令 八 ヰJ # 箸�.�������6x�"�l も 八 ヰJ 良 @ 八 l 冢ﾂ�ﾜR��r�9��l 令 八 ヰJ 制 空 # 箸�.����9�｢�謔�2�ｧ��I 令 八 ヰ一 宏 梶 官 鳴�.��J｢�9�爾��r�ｨ��ﾘ�����l も A ヰ一 隻 舵 已. ■t 白�}����9�｢����ｩｲ�ｽ��DT��
∫ 18 ��"����撫 乖��喪 儿��lJ �ｨ��ﾒ�6x8ﾒ�EE 唸耳uR�%��1Ⅱ ♯ �.��咽 兔ｲ�=ヽ 令 �2�酵 豚�"�}��=ヽ 令 �.��堰 �ｨ爾茲��r�辰 仄��▲J 17 俐2�
QP 抑 定 臣 忙 胆 鎖 剿Z 価 # 册｢�幵�nﾂ�4E a 鮮 盟 せ一 # A a 轍 も 俯"�����ﾉe2�ｬr�=｢��*ﾒ��"����}B�E 鴫 川 亦�$ﾅ��$B�如 惑 # 野 草 壁 A 至 i 煤 刎��ﾆ"�Lr�ｫ��2�調�2�ﾍ2���陲�ﾇB�)��和 忠 # l亡 管 1≦ 杏 EE 刎�������ﾎr�<r����"�k�����2����)��&r��uR���B�4正 男 胡 # ･Ⅲ ～ �(b�:｢�^2����ｬr�Ⅸ�nr��"����$��勺Ⅱ 頭 鮮 或 胡 # 毎 も I 岳 ll 女 i dt H 仗��8ﾂ�6B�y��ｧ��e｢�ｬr�nr����X��ﾇ��o��ﾟ"�I 令 八 ヰJ 八 l =ヽ 令 吏 1 ぜ * 刎��"�Kｲ�2�酊�酊�6��DR�TR�1口 頭 刺 # # 野 義 FEl 白�-b��ﾂ�������ﾘ�"�}��tﾂ���ｶ��軸 a 判 # # 防 義 吹 臣 @ 偃r�ﾜR�2�fR�R����ﾆ"�ﾍ2�2�ｶ���*ﾒ��2�2�軸 a 固 定 岳 忙 管 増 A 曹 輔 Fg 刎��(��M�B�m�｢��"�e｢�ｻ���ﾒ����"���ｮr�IE ∃ Ei 恥 册｢�H���耳7�ｨ蔗��R苒�忙 8u A 一■■ - 册｢��(爾��2�耳���ﾒ��r�












(.tlv-u^ff(V)dv : IBtlv-uBlf(V)dv - 〟. : NB　　　　(1)

















NB嘉EIv･･ -u^If･1 -N･嘉tJv･･ -uBIf･･
NB嘉EJv･･ -u･rf･･ 'NA嘉tlv･･ -uBJf･.
(3)









































!i -<-< 劍�ｸ�ｲ�����,ﾂ�さ の ド- 稗�DB�ｧ���ｲ�の Cq ～ lヽ■ rr} �,ﾂ�耳�｢�璽��の tJ> q} ～ �6��8ﾗﾒ�*ﾘ�S�����LL7 A の ○○ M ��ｸ�ｲ�D｣��6x����ｸ�ｲ�司 rr7 0 ～ ��ｲ��X��ﾒ����DB��ｸ�T��ド q> ○○ ～ �����ｨ�｢��｢�,ﾂ��"�の 〇一 畠 �6x���ｸ�(爾����rr) ド tr 勇��6�����く占l く> ～ �,ﾂ�,X耳,"�,ﾂ�ﾂ�tp V 一一 ド rr) �"ﾒ��X�������*ﾘ��ﾂ��ｸ�(爾�ト ト ○ く> ～ 汎｢s��6ぴ�D�����等 ト ○○ �2�32�○○ fY> くけ ��ｸ�ｲ�,ﾂ�*ﾓ��6��の 芯 蜘G"�D��*ﾓ��ﾄﾃ��く> ～ tJ> �*ﾖﾈ�"�ｧ��'#��
lコ 壷< 劍6��ﾈ耳爾��ﾂﾒ����,ﾂ����く丘l t l､.- t▼> く○ ����''ﾒ�'#��○○ < くーI Lh �'���ｸ�ｲ�ﾈ�(���*ﾂ��X��ﾒ�く> トー rr> ～ ��ｸ�ｲ�,ﾂ��ｸ�ｲ�'#�����～ 冨 宮 �6r�辻���ﾒ��ｸ�ｲ�ﾂ�一つ ○○ tE> <> rr7 �6x���ﾂ�"��ﾒ�S��q> 'tr ○ < �,ﾂ�8ｨ�ｲ�%白�r����rr} u1 ー■ウ ～ �*ﾓ��*ﾓ�����6ぴ�ド LL> 卜ー 優､S���B�''ﾒ����■一} ⊂> 巾 ～ 綿�(���*ﾓ��耳爾�6x���隻 LL> I- ���e途�*ﾓ���ｸ�ｲ�����～ の I t- ト■ 冉ﾘ爾�ﾖﾂ�6x���ｽ�4R�u一 の 〇〇 〇〇 ■つ ��ｸ�ｲ�6や����ﾄﾃ��ﾒ�ﾒ�t M ト■ く> ーヽ一 冉ﾘ���D｣��W�������ﾒ�の - く> q} n 刎｢��ｨ�ｲ�,ﾂ�亡> tP ▼- ～ I- 白闔｣��耳痔��*ﾘ*��*ﾘ�ｲ�������
慶 寒害 晦 劍*ﾓ��(自)｢�8ﾘ�ｲ�ド く> ～ �'#r����○○ LD 一一■} �ｪH��������%cr�く> ○○ ��ｶﾈ,"��｢�耳爾�LLI l∫一 ～ �*ﾘ*��ﾄﾃ�����⊂> LL> �'#��LL> く> ーけ �����������卜■ �*ﾓ������ｵd��tO ▼- ��ｸ�ｲ�,ﾂ�lヽ- く> �9���ﾈ��爾�く> ○■ 舒��○○ rr) 挽�6r�○○ く> Cq ����*ﾓ��ﾂ�～ ～ ��ｸ�ｲ�q> u1 q} �*ﾘ*��8ﾘ�ｲ�l.′> tD ～ 幽��������定耳爾�ﾄﾂ��
■ 偬��≡ ..■こ ��ト ○○ く> �,ﾂ�ﾂ闔ｨ爾�*ﾓ��l∫> ～ t- 冖��く○ ド- < ����○○ Cq 一一一 ��ｷ���ｸ�ｲ�e途�LL> rr7 I- 貌d������5&ﾂ�▼- �*ﾓ��,ﾂ����功 一トー rr) �,ﾂ�''ﾒ�ﾂ�弓 rr> 仗R�&ﾈ4R�ド 〇〇 l.一一 優S��ﾒ�$途�～ の 1ー 汎ﾄ���ｸ�ｲ� 僥R�q> ○○ rr> ��～ t■l �*ﾓ������ｲ� ���G��lヽ■ LL> ��
世 ～ ��r� ���C���tO ～ ��ｸ�ｲ�ﾂ�～ LL> �'"��$蜘ﾒ�Cq rr> ����耳�S��罵 辻�M 優B�ﾒ�○○ ●- �6x���卜■ 芳"�耳耳爾�u1 ��X����爾����FV> �$白�○○ 1ー ��M 祐�� ���ｲ�ー■■■ ��ー■■■ 一つ ��ｸ�ｲ�$陳�
令 ��く> �*ﾓ�� ��rI'} �� ����～ ��く> ����～ �'#��▼■- ����1ー ����く> �*ﾓ�� �*ﾓ�� ��1■ �*ﾓ�� 白ﾔ��く> 
哩 ��r� �,ﾂ���○○ < ���痔��X�ｲ�く> ～ 汎ﾃ��O ▼- 優｣��g��～ I.一一 廼"�ト■ LL> �ｨ而ﾒ����～ rr> ���6x���一一 汎ﾃ��ﾒ�< 優�����ド 1■ ��ｸ�ｲ����tO t ��～ < ��ｸ�ｲ���G"� ��ｸ�ｲ�-一 ��○○ ���ﾂ�
■ 凩�� �*ﾓ��○ ���� �*ﾓ��一一 ����く> ����～ �*ﾓ��○ ��<> ��X������� �*ﾓ��く> ����く> ��く> �� ��～ ��▼■■■ �*ﾓ��
世 # ��r� 綿璽��'"��の 亡ヽ一 �'#r���ｲ�一一7 1r 綿�(������ら 禿��○○ ～ �6x���I ～ ��ｸ�ｲ�eb��くけ ーV7 乃"�○○ ��ｨ�｢�ﾒ�～ 一■ウ 汎ﾃ�����○○ �,ﾂ������ｲ�～ LL> ��○○ l■一 �<r� ��一一 1ー ��罵 �9��
令 ��LL> ～ �,ﾂ����～ rr> 葡����○○ tヽ■ 僥ﾂ�～ ～ 汎ﾃ�����○ tr ���,"�tr ～ �ｩ)｢�ﾈ耳爾�LL> 一ロー �6x���ﾂ�一つ Pd �<r�～ ーq 優S���"�ト LJ'> �<r� �,ﾂ�ﾄﾃ��笥 ��t- 一一 唯���� 郵爾�X爾�5! 
也 ��○ tr - ��ｲ���ｲ��Rﾒ�く> '■r �*ﾓ����G"�○ tr ■- �*ﾓ��ﾂ�く> ■■ー ��ｲ���ｲ�○ ■tr �*ﾓ��ﾂ�く> 1 �,ﾂ�'#��tn fV> ���耳耳爾�亡lI " ▼■- ���5B�耳,"�の 一一I �*ﾓ��ﾂ�く> ■■ー �*ﾓ����ｲ� ��ｲ�ﾂ�<> ■■ー ��○ 1ー ▼- �*ﾓ����ｲ� �*ﾓ������ﾒ�く> I 
由 冢r�∫ ��I- 犯����ｲ�■■■■ ～ �,ﾂ�ﾂ� ����S��l.一一 ��ｸ�ｲ�○ 1ー 白�t- ��ｲ��ｷ"�I ����ﾂ�ド- -■ 汎ﾃ��等 僥ﾂ�の �6�� �,ﾂ�く■■ LLI ��tb u一 �<r� 辻�ﾔ鋳�～ ～ 
令 ��LL> 1■ 汎ﾃ����ｲ�5! �ｨ耳4R�く丘l ～ �,ﾂ����の ��ｸ�ｲ�～ 汎ﾃ��読 �,ﾂ����- ○■ ��ｸ�ｲ�''ﾒ� �ｨ,"�一一I 優､��(�ｴ��く> < �����ｲ� ��ｸ�ｲ�ﾒ�の ～ ��1ー ～ 汎ﾃ����� ������ｲ�tE} l■■I 
トー M �6x爾�ﾏｸ爾�ト■ rr) 綿�(����ｸ耳,"�ド 一一一 �6ぴ�''ﾒ�ー■■■ rr> �6��耳�X爾�ド 一一I 冉ﾘ���ｽ�r�qp fY) �6r�ﾒ�lヽ■ M 冉ﾘ爾�耳耳爾�卜■ rr> 綿6r����耳耳4R�ド fY> 冉ﾘ���&ﾇB�ト■ ーq �6��耳,"� �"ﾒ�''ﾒ�ド- 一つ ��ド- rr> 冉ﾘ���ﾒ� �6x�ｲ�e凪�tD rVI 
也 
A 由 【コ 冢r�b� ��ｲ�e途�tr - �����rr7 汎ﾃ��'#��く> tD 覇白�○○ ～ ����tO �8ｨ�ｲ�S��tr I- 督�く> 汎ﾄ��ﾒ�の l.一一 綿6x爾�耳���■tr 鳴闔ｨ爾�ﾄﾃ��q} 1r �*ﾓ��G"�< 綿�(������l一一 lJ> �6��ﾄﾃ��l.一一 ～ �������■亡:I ▼■■■ ��ｷ��tJ> 
令 冉ﾘ�ｲ����t○ ～ �,ﾂ����高 幽��爾�7��tY} 汎B���4R�く> ～ ��ｸ�ｲ����〇〇 一一一 ������ｲ�l一一 ～ 郵�ｲ�ﾂ����○○ FV7 �*ﾓ��ﾄﾂ��～ ��ｸ�ｲ�G"�○○ ～ �ｩ)｢�G"�■一一■ リー 牝､��ﾄﾇﾒ�○○ LL} �*ﾘ*��8ｨ�ｲ�ト l一一 坪�ｲ����く> ～ 亦����～ 一一一 �<r�く> ■一一 
也 �*ﾓ��ﾂ�く> 1■ ��ｲ���く:> tr �*ﾓ��ﾂ�○ < ��ｲ���ｲ�O t �*ﾓ��ﾂ�○ I �*ﾓ����ｲ�く> < �,ﾂ�%cr��X��ﾒ�の rr> - �,ﾂ�耳璽��の rr} �,ﾂ�'#��中 一ウ ��ﾃ����○ 1:r �*ﾓ������○ < ��ｲ�ﾂ�○ 1■ ▼- �*ﾓ��ﾂ�く> 1ー �*ﾓ����ｲ�く> ■■ー ��ｲ���く> ■■ー 
也 ��～ ～ �,ﾂ�DS��く> < ����一つ〇 〇〇 �*ﾘｷVﾂ�く○ ■■ー �,ﾂ�'#��<> 幽�Wﾒ�耳耳4R�○○ く> �ｨ,(�ｲ����～ �6x���ﾄB�の ～ ����ド- rr) ��ｸ�ｲ�,ﾂ�～ ���ｲ�■ウ 畔耳爾�'"��リー ����fﾘ���○○ M ��ｨ�｢�而��一ロ一 一一ウ �%cr�rr> ～ 優S��^J= 汎ﾄ� � ｲ�リ1 ■tr 牝ﾇﾒ�ﾂ�r- < �ｩ)｢�'" �く○ ～ 優 � � tp �*ﾖﾈ爾�く> ～ �ｸ�ｲ�○○ リー �*ﾓ��耳,"�q> ～ � ｸ�ｲ�%途�く> ����< �*ﾓ�� r■一... FV7 ��ｸ�ｲ�ﾂ�rr> ーヽ一 ��ｸ ｲ�○○ ～ �'#r�� �ロー ～ �'�����く> �ｨ,"�卜■ LLI 
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人口重心から 尾ｶﾒ�1km �&ｶﾒ�3km 擢ｶﾒ�5km 吐ｶﾒ�
の距離 ����～ ����～ ����～ ����
(以上～以内) ��ｶﾒ�2km �6ｶﾒ�4km 天ｶﾒ�6km 砺ｶﾒ�
施設数 �"��4 �"�7 釘�2 迭�


























































































































ll] A･ Ando, Locations of NIMBYFacilities: WhenTwoAdjacent CommunitiesDecide



























































を仮定する･ここに, QLはリンク)の輸送密度, tLはリンクlのラインホール時間, MC(QL)
1 Bruecknerand Spiller(1991)などでは, MC(Ql) ∃ 1-0 ･Q'のような特定化により輸送密度の経済性が考慮
され費用は運航距離に全く依存しない･ BruecknerandSpiller(1991)のモデルを出発点とする多くの理論的研


























































ODAB - ODJW - aCOST^B rR(.･,,A)
ODBC - OTbBC - aCOSTBC IR(.･,,.,
oDAc - OTb^C - acosTAc IR.i,,,







J--ABJC,BC co:Iwk?DLdCOST･･ ) ･ ∑jd如Jr, ･n･F
(4)













































































































































a A.1仇T dIjA tEO.05. dzO.40
匠∃窒Ⅰ罰 
i/tC- (.jN L++ ��(,車.T ■ �(爾竰�D��rゝこ■_3 亡ヽ ー′& 亦脛�"ぴ������2�$読ﾒ� ����ｲ� ���○ ���0<O ★■ ▼★ ������0 ��ｲ����0 ���0 �4ｧD��耳���
lヽー (.Jd ��■l､ ■ ���2ﾂ�どC��ご如Q tJl,,A ++ 友鐙�UB���ﾂﾈ,ｲ� ����ｶﾂ���つ ～ ��ｲ�勺 ■ I ��ﾒ�莞鉢 Tt ������チ.. �*ﾘ爾��r����lJ 冢r�����r�¢ �+ﾔ���(���










4 ▼0.40. 7'■030, td.】0, dll.00
1▲★■tJIt 
層-nF狛狛賢lf研き 童�軍x��H�顯b�ミ烏甘苦甘甘 
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凡例 
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4 A.40, T dJO, td.0!, All.00
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Jro - P13q三3 + pl2q三2 -oc(q三3) - oc(q三2) ,
Jrb三P23qb23 + pl2ql2 - oc(qb23) I 0C(qL2) ,









諺-pl2 lql2 ･β扉苛平-(1-0･qLn･E12 -0α
qc23
纂-pコー土qcD･β前売乎-(1-0･qcD,･ED =oα
















p132 -土oTbJW -土qc132 I β
1　　　　　　1




α       α
航空会社の利潤関数を,
- Y(E23 + 113)　　(6-a)
JrD = P13q三3 - oc(q三3) ,
3rb - P23qb23 - oc(qb23) ,















alC　- r (qb23 +qc23 +qc132)2
13 1_13.0　　qc13
pl3 -エqc13 +β
alC - ｢ (qi3+qc13+qc132)2










(qD13 + q,13 + qc132)2
qc132
























(q三2 + qL2 + q三23)








JrD - P12q三2 -oc(q三2) ,
Jrb - P23qb23. pl2q三2 + pl23q三23 - oc(qb23 ･ q三23) 10C(ql2 ･ q三23) ,















(q三2 + ql2 + ql23)2
覧=pか-土q㌘.β
(qb23 + ql23 + qc23)2





































α　　　　　　　α (q三2 + ql2)
-γ･∫12
航空会社の利潤関数を
JrD壬P13q三3 + pl4q三4 + pl2q三2 - oc(q三3) - oc(q三4) - oc(q三2)
3rbコP23qb23 + p24qb24 + pl2ql2 - oc(qb23) - oc(qb24) - oc(qb12)
Jr. - P23q,23 + pl3qc13 + p24qc24 + pl4qc14 - oc(qc23) - oc(qc13) - oc(q,24) - oc(q.14)
とすると,利潤最大の1階条件は次のように書ける.
q;3







































p142 = ⊥oTb,W _
Lq,132. p 1　　　　　　　1
alc I r (q,23+q,132) 'r (q三3 +qc132)
去oT6- - [
















･qc142'･ γ ･(124 ･t14,1  (9-b,
(qi3 + qc13 + qc132)
1
(q三4 + qc14 + qc142)
1
(qb23 + qc23 + ql32)
1
(qb24 + qc24 + q142)
･y ･t13 ･i]  (9-C,
･r ･t14 ･i]  (9-d,
･r ･tコ･言]  (9-C,
･γ･tu ･i]  (9-～
7rD壬P13ql3 + pl4q三4 - oc(q三3) - oc(q三4),
Jr. = P23qb23 + p24qb24 -oc(qb23) - oc(qb24)
Jrc - P23qE23 + pl3qc13 + p24qc24 + pl4qc14 + pl32q.132 + pl42qc142
- OC(q,23 + qc132) - oc(qc13 + q.132) - oc(qc24 + q,142) -oc(q,14 + q,142)
72
とすると,利潤最大の1階条件は以下のように書ける.






(q三3 + q,13 + q.132)2
q:4
(qi4 + ql4 + q.142)2
-　qb23
(qb23 + qc23 + ql32)2
qb24

















-(1-0･lqc24 +q,142])･f24 - 0





(q!3 + ql3 + q,132)2
qc23
(qb23 + qc23 + qE132)2





(q14 + qc14 + q:42)2
qc24
(qb24 + qc24 + ql42)2




























(q三2 +ql2 +q三23 +ql24)
土(qbb.qcD). β
α
(qb23 + q三23 + qc23)




(qb24 + ql24 + qc24)
1　　　　　　1















Jro - P12q三2 -oc(q三2) ,
Jrb - P23qb2㌧ pl2q三2 ･ p24qb24. pl23qL23. pl24ql24
- OC(qb23 ･ q三23) A 0C(qb24 ･ qL24) I 0C(ql2. q三23. ql24)
7r. - P23q.23 i p24q.24 - oc(qc23) - oc(qc24)
とすると,利潤最大の1階の条件は以下のように書ける;





(qb23 + ql23 + q,23)2
1
(qb24 + ql24 + qc24)2
-(1le lqb23 +q三23])･123 =0
-(1-0 lqb24 +ql24])･124 -0
纂-〆コー土qLv･β蕗･β講読･βα
+β
(q三2 +qL2 +qL23 +ql24)2
(qb23 + ql23 + q,23)2










(q三2 +ql2 + qb123 + ql24)2
-(1-0 lqL2 ･qL24])･t12 -(lle lqb24.qま24])･124 =o
α10 'r (q三2+ql2 +q三23+qL24)2
1 _23. a qE23
隻-クか一土qcv.β



































Jro I P12qlo2+pl4qlD4-oc(q三2) - oc(q三4) ,
3rb壬P23qb23 + pl2q三2 - oc(qb23) - oc(qL2) ,
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